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I. INTRODUCTION
Although terrorism utilizes unlawful methods for intimidation and
the promotion of fear, the response to it should be directed at ensuring
the rule of law. ' As Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated:
Terrorist acts ... constitute grave violations of human rights. Our
responses to terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent
it should uphold the human rights that terrorists aim to destroy.
Human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are essen-
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1. See The Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism, 1 1, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/266
(Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism] (referring to G.A. Res. 57/219, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/219 (Dec.
18, 2002)).
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tial tools in the effort to combat terrorism-not privileges to be sac-
rificed at a time of tension.2
Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise
Arbour, opined that in the long run, "a commitment to uphold respect
for human rights and rule of law will be one of the keys to success in
countering terrorism-not an impediment blocking our way."3
These observations suggest that rather than fall victim to terror-
ism, human rights should be used affirmatively to conquer it. In this
endeavor, twenty-first century policy-makers have sought unsuccess-
fully to delimit and identify the meaning of terrorism and to determine
the role international human rights law should play. The links be-
tween terrorism and human rights pose many questions: What acts
constitute terrorism? What sensitivity should framers of a definition
of terrorism have concerning the self-determination of peoples within
a state? Should terrorism be looked upon solely as a law enforcement
issue, as a military issue, as a reflection of disparate social and wealth
distribution, or as all three? Is a solution to the pandemic of terrorism
grounded in international human rights law and, if so, how does it re-
flect the changing worldview of the role of human rights? What are
the underlying conditions and root causes of terrorist behavior, and
how can they be diminished? As the world's lone superpower, what
role does the United States play in combating terrorism, and what are
the consequences of human rights failures in the United States' "war
on terrorism"? Most importantly, how do policy-makers stop the vio-
lence and bloodshed without compromising accepted norms or revers-
ing positive global trends in human rights?
To address the scourge of terrorism, a consensus on its basic ele-
ments and an acknowledgement of the applicability of human rights
jurisprudence are necessary. In addition, addressing terrorism will re-
quire universal adherence to human rights norms even in the face of
extremist violence and political pressure. To analyze the questions
posed here, this article will examine the problem of terrorism from a
human rights perspective. This examination will entail describing the
direct and indirect impact of terrorism on human rights. It will also
require a review of the historical impediments to a solution to terror-
2. Press Release, The Secretary General, All Must Work Together to Counter Terror-
ism, Prevent Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Secretary-General Says, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/8624-SC/7680 (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release, The Secretary General],
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8624.doc.htm.
3. Louise Arbour, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Security Under the Rule of Law,
Keynote Address Before the Biennial Conference of the International Commission of Jurists
(Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2004/cp0431.pdf.
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ism, including the tension between those who consider terrorism to be
a reflection of greater sociopolitical-economic disparities and those
who consider it strictly as a law enforcement or military issue. More-
over, this article will discuss the emerging role of human rights juris-
prudence and counter-terrorism initiatives, seek a direction modeled
after the template of the U.N. Comprehensive Plan to Combat Terror-
ism, discuss alternatives to fashioning an immutable definition of ter-
rorism, and analyze both stand-alone human rights strategies for ad-
dressing terrorism and the incorporation of strict adherence to human
rights norms into more traditional models of counter-terrorism.
II. THE LINK BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM
In response to growing concerns over mounting discord among
states, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan formed the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (High-level Panel).4 On
December 2, 2004, the High-level Panel proffered "a new vision of
collective security for the 21st century" in a report that included 101
recommendations for revitalizing the United Nations in order to make
it capable of addressing modern threats.5 These efforts include a pro-
posed definition of terrorism6 and a comprehensive global strategy for
combating it.7 Certain key recommendations of the report call upon
the United Nations to:
4. See Kofi A. Annan, Foreword to SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON
THREATS, CHALLENGES & CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
vii (2004) [hereinafter A MORE SECURE WORLD], available at http://www.un.org/secure-
world/report2.pdf.
5. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES & CHANGE, A
MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2004) [herein-
after EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf; Horst
Rutsch, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, High-Level Panel Presents New
Vision of Collective Security, U.N. CHRON. ONLINE EDITION, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chroni-
cle/2004/issue4/0404p77.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). The threats identified by the report
were broken down into six "clusters" as follows: "war between States; violence within States,
including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious dis-
ease, and environmental degradation; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
terrorism; and transnational organized crime." EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra, at 2.
6. A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 4, M 157-64, at 51-52.. The Panel proposes that
the definition include:
[A]ny action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions
on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and the Security Council resolu-
tion 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians
or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to in-
timidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act.
Id. T 164(d), at 52.
7. Id. annex 1 1 3844, at 103-04.
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a) ... [R]everse the causes or facilitators of terrorism... [by]
promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and
democratic reform[,] . . . address major political griev-
ances[,] ... reduc[e] poverty and underemployment[,] and
stop[] State collapse;
b) . . . [C]ounter extremism and intolerance ... through edu-
cation and fostering public debate;
c) Develop[] . . . better instruments for global counter-
terrorism cooperation ... within a legal framework that is
respectful of civil liberties and human rights...;
d) Build[] State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and
operations; [and
e) Control ... dangerous material and public health defense.8
These key recommendations were later reflected in the Secretary-
General's keynote speech at the International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism, and Security on March 10, 2005, in his articulation of five
strategies, which he called the "five D's."
They are:
* first to dissuade disaffected from choosing terrorism as a
tactic to achieve their goals;
* second, to deny terrorists the means to carry out their at-
tacks;
* third, to deter states from supporting terrorists;
* fourth, to develop state capacity to prevent terrorism;
* and fifth, to defend human rights in the struggle against ter-
rorism.9
The "five D's" and the High-level Panel's key recommendations
can loosely be categorized into three distinct models for combating
terrorism: military, law enforcement, and human rights. The first
model, military intervention in response to terrorist acts or their immi-
nent threat, is grounded in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions (U.N. Charter).' 0 The military model, as limited by certain con-
8. Id. 38, at 103.
9. Kofi A. Annan, The Secretary-General, United Nations, A Global Strategy for Fight-
ing Terrorism, Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on De-
mocracy, Terrorism and Security (Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Annan, Global Strategy], avail-
able at http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-
terrorism.html#transcripcion; UNITED NATIONS FOUND., FACT SHEET: THE UN's
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTER-TERRORISM 1, http://www.unfoundation.org/files/pdf/2005/
UNCounterterrorismFact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter UNITED
NATIONs FOUND.].
10. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 5. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
4
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ditional prerequisites, 1 includes peacekeeping tasks, deterring state
support for terrorism by threat of military intervention, developing
state preventive capacity by providing military aid, and assisting in the
orderly distribution of humanitarian aid.12 This model can also be ef-
fective in preempting imminent threats of attacks and correcting on-
going terrorist activities when civilian authorities are unwilling or un-
able to intercede.
Law enforcement, the second model, is grounded in international
criminal law and extant core anti-terrorism conventions. 13 In contrast
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51. On December 3, 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged
that the Panel explicitly "reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves, including preemp-
tively when an attack is imminent .... Kofi Annan, Editorial, A Way Forward on Global
Security, http://www.un.org/secureworld/oped.htrrl (last visited Mar. 13, 2006) (this editorial,
reportedly published in the Dec. 3, 2004 version of the INT'L HERALD TRIB., does not appear
actually to have been published there).
11. Kofi Annan, Editorial, Courage to Fulfill Our Responsibilities, THE ECONOMIST,
Dec. 2 2004, available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/oped.html. The High-level Panel's
report limits the use of force to imminent threats and postulates five basic guidelines to be
considered:
Seriousness of threat: Is the threat serious enough to justify prima facie the use of
force?
Proper purpose: Is the primary purpose of the proposed use of force to halt or
avert the threat in question?
Last resort: Has every non-military option been explored and exhausted?
Proportional means: Is the force proposed the minimum necessary to meet the
threat?
Balance of consequences: Is it clear that the consequences of the action will not be
worse than the consequences of inaction?
Id.
12. One example of the use of the military for the distribution of humanitarian aid was
the U.S. response to a famine jeopardizing 700,000 people in Somalia during the early 1990s.
See RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 84 (2004).
Then-President George H.W. Bush sent troops to Somalia to protect relief supplies that were
being stolen by armed Somalis. Id. Ultimately, President Clinton escalated the military pres-
ence and oversight of the relief operation, which resulted in the successful distribution of aid.
Cf. id. at 85-87.
13. There are a number of United Nations counter-terrorism conventions. United Na-
tions Treaty Collection, Conventions on Terrorism, http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terror-
ism.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2006); see International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY DoC. No. 106-6, 39 I.L.M. 270; Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, S. TREATY DoC.
No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, S. TREATY DoC. No. 103-8, 30 I.L.M. 721; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S.
TREATY DoC. No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; International Convention Against the Taking of
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to the military model, which employs armed forces and treats terror-
ism as a military problem, this model is largely carried out by civilian
authorities and treats terrorism as a criminal matter, albeit in virulent
form. The law enforcement model is addressed by the U.N. strategy
to combat terrorism as a mechanism to "[d]eny[] terrorists the means
to carry out attacks" and "[d]evelop[] state preventative capacity."14
The High-level Panel's recommendation to develop better instruments
for global counter-terrorism within a legal framework fits into a law
enforcement model.' 5 So, too, does its recommendations for greater
cooperation between states with respect to investigation, sharing in-
formation, extradition, and freezing financial accounts thought to be
tied to terrorism. Moreover, law enforcement as an investigatory in-
strument is arguably in the best position to control the distribution of
dangerous material.
The third model, human rights, consists primarily of preventative
measures and is grounded in applicable international and humanitarian
law, as well as human rights conventions and jurisprudence. It ad-
dresses the causes of terrorism in order to "dissuad[e] the disaffected
from choosing terrorist tactics" and "defend[] human rights in the
struggle against the scourge of terror."16 The High-level Panel speci-
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physi-
cal Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Sei-
zure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704
U.N.T.S. 219.
There are also a number of regional conventions that address terrorism. See United Nations
Treaty Collection, supra; OAU [Organization of African Unity] Convention on the Prevention
and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Ter-
rorism/oau_e.pdf; Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating
International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/54/637* annex (Oct. 11,
2000); Treaty on the Cooperation Among States Members of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
English/Terrorism/csi-e.pdf; SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation]
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/EnglishiTerrorism/Convl8.pdf; Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docsleague/ terror-
ism98.htm; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S.
90; Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T.
3949, 1986 U.N.T.S. 195 (registered by the Organization of American States (OAS)).
14. UNITED NATIONS FOUND., supra note 9, at 1; Annan, Global Strategy, supra note 9.
15. See generally Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Coun-
tering Terrorism, supra note 1; Press Release, The Secretary-General, supra note 2.
16. UNITED NATIONS FOUND., supra note 9, at 1; Annan, Global Strategy, supra note 9.
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fies numerous social and political justice issues, past grievances, and
poverty issues that must be addressed in order to foster a new sense of
tolerance in communities currently given to extremism.
A human rights approach consists of a two-part initiative, stand-
alone and integrated. The first initiative, a stand-alone approach, is
designed to relieve the underlying suffering that fosters terrorism. Re-
lief is accomplished by providing real, rather than token, aid to devel-
oping nations, by forgiving national debts that strangle local econo-
mies, and by building infrastructure to provide public health care,
primary education, safe water and sewage, and childhood immuniza-
tions. Relief is also accomplished by allowing developing nations to
realize a fair, rather than token, profit from their own natural resources
and by leveling the playing field to enable them to trade in the interna-
tional marketplace. In addition to economic relief, this stand-alone
approach addresses political grievances and promotes multicultural-
ism, self-determination of peoples without external interference, and
the other civil and political human rights enshrined in the U.N. Decla-
ration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights. 7 By improving the status quo and curing many of
these underlying conditions, peoples will have more to protect and,
consequently, less reason to fall prey to extremism or to assist those
who commit wanton acts of violence.
The second initiative, an integrated approach, calls for establish-
ing human rights norms as an integral component in the other two
models. To be effective, the law enforcement and military models
must place primacy on human rights norms or the reaction to these
models will multiply resistance. Terrorism is indefinitely prolonged
when counter-terrorism measures ignite greater violence and tap the
reservoir of the disaffected, thus increasing recruitment and creating
several new terrorists for each one apprehended. By stemming abuses
within the other models, the integrated approach circumvents such ter-
rorist recruitment.
The U.N. global strategy recognizes the importance of these hu-
man rights initiatives as well as the need for the other two models and
opts for a holistic strategy that incorporates all three models.1 8 The
key to the U.N. global strategy for combating terrorism is the overlap
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16,1966).
18. See UNITED NATIONS FOUND., supra note 9, at 1.
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and intra-dependence of each of the models in order to address the
problem, comprehensively utilizing all available approaches.
Law Human
Strategies: the Five "D's" Military Enforcement Rights
Dissuading the disaffected from
choosing terrorist tactics 9  X
Denying terrorists the means to carry
out attacks20  X
Deterring state support for terrorism21  X
Developing state preventative capac-
ity22  X X X
Defending human rights in the strug-
gle against the scourge of terror23  X X X
This chart demonstrates the holistic approach incorporated by the
Secretary-General's "five D's." "Dissuading the disaffected from
choosing terrorist tactics"' 24 is the principle strategy of the stand alone
human rights model and, while the other models may serve some de-
terrent value, the use of force has never been an effective tool for
changing opinions or curbing overzealous and extremist outlooks.
The strategy of "[d]enying terrorists the means to carry out attacks" 25
references the availability of weapons and the vulnerability of poten-
tial targets and is best addressed by the investigatory capabilities of
the law enforcement model. Theoretically, this strategy could be real-
ized under the other models, too. For example, terrorist organizations
require people, so curtailing recruitment of, killing, or capturing exist-
ing personnel may impede attacks. However, such interaction is too
attenuated and is already accounted for in the other strategies.
"Deterring state support of terrorism" 26 is a military strategy. The
deterrent value of an armed attack is most effective when dealing with
state entities. "Developing state preventive capacity" 27 is a task that
requires an approach employing multiple models. Under the military
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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model, military aid can create state preventive capacity. Under the
law enforcement model, the free exchange of information, law en-
forcement techniques, and technologies can foster increased arrests of
terrorists. Under the human rights model, particularly the stand-alone
initiative, a more grass-roots approach builds infrastructure and re-
lieves the underlying misery that pushes ordinary people into extrem-
ism. The integrated human rights initiative keeps the other two mod-
els in check, preventing their excesses from providing terrorist
organizations a factual basis for pro-terrorist propaganda.
The strategy of "[d]efending human rights in the struggle against
the scourge of terror"28 involves all three models, both in terms of pre-
venting terrorist attacks and in ensuring that counter-terrorist measures
conform to acceptable standards. This tripartite structure is designed
to maximize the effectiveness of each of the three models and to pro-
vide a synergy that exceeds the sum of the component parts. Each
model is less effective by itself; alone, the military model lacks pre-
vention and moral certainty, the law enforcement model lacks strength
to act globally against state-sponsored terrorism, and the human rights
model lacks enforcement capability. The human rights model implied
by the High-level Panel's recommendations increases the effective-
ness of the other models and represents a break from traditional
counter-terrorism policy.29 It does so by ensuring that both law en-
28. Id.
29. Traditionally, human rights played little role in U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Dur-
ing the 1980s, U.S. counter-terrorism policy was concerned with fostering cooperation be-
tween federal agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
State, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The policy acknowledged the threat posed by
state-sponsored terrorism and "outlined guidelines for preventing and responding to acts of
terrorism." Ctr. for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, History of U.S. Counter-terrorism
Policy, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/I01/history.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2006). In the 1990's, President Clinton issued a series of Presidential Decision Directives
(PDDs), which established a ten-element U.S. counter-terrorism policy:
I. Apprehension, Extradition, Rendition and Prosecution of Terrorists
2. Disruption of Terrorist Operations
3. International Cooperation
4. Preventing the Acquisition of [Weapons of Mass Destruction]
5. Consequence Management
6. Transportation Security
7. Protection of Critical Infrastructure
8. Continuity of Government
9. Countering Foreign Terrorist Group Threat in the US
10. Protecting Americans Overseas
Roger Cressey, Dir., Transnational Threats, Nat'l Sec. Council, U.S. Counter-Terrorism Pol-
icy & Org., Remarks Before the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Security Studies
Program Seminar (Sept. 27, 2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/ssp/fall00/cressey.htm; see
also Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U) (June 21, 1995),
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forcement and military actions are performed in accordance with ac-
cepted human rights norms, thus limiting the negative consequences.
Conscientious and compassionate performance of duty by law en-
forcement and military personnel helps to avoid the conditions that
promote terrorist recruitment. Because the integrated human rights
initiative not only engenders more widespread human rights practices,
but also serves to defuse anger and prevent the resort to extremism, it
is integral to the struggle against terrorism.
Additionally, many of the High-level Panel's 101 recommenda-
tions, such as the key recommendation that the United Nations build
state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations, imply
the importance of utilizing all three counter-terrorism models. The
High-level Panel's other key recommendations also imply the use of
multiple models. Preventing state collapse implies the military model,
whereas the control of dangerous material and developing better in-
struments for global counter-terrorism within a legal framework both
imply the law enforcement model. Building public health defense, re-
ducing poverty and underemployment, disabling the causes and facili-
tators of terrorism by promoting social and political rights, rule of law
available at http:/www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm; Presidential Decision Directive 62,
Combating Terrorism (May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-
62.htm; Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures
(May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-63.htm; Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Op-
erations (U) (Oct. 21, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-67.htm.
Currently, the U.S. State Department Counter-terrorism Office postulates its counter-terrorism
policy as fourfold:
First, make no concession to terrorists and strike no deals;
Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes;
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them
to change their behavior; and
Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work
with the U.S. and require assistance.
U.S. Dep't of State, Counter-Terrorism Office, http:/www.state.gov/s/ct/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2006). The ten elements of counter-terrorism policy under the Clinton administration did ref-
erence "[p]rotection of [c]ritical [i]nfrastructure" and "[c]ontinuity of [g]ovemment," which
could be looked upon as human rights issues. However, they are contextually necessary for
the maintenance of the other law enforcement and military strategies as infrastructure and
government continuity are critical for investigation, apprehension, and extradition, as well the
protection of U.S. citizens overseas. Cressey, supra. Moreover, this policy analyzes neither
the human rights record of the government whose continuity is to be assured, nor the possibil-
ity of discriminatory or prohibited practices created by the infrastructure to be protected, ei-
ther of which could lead to greater disaffection among the citizens and heightened terrorist
activity. Both the Clinton administration's policy and the current policy articulated by the
U.S. State Department lack any specific prioritization or reference to the underlying causes of
terrorism or calls for social, political, or economic reform of those regions most at risk for
terrorist recruitment. See id.; U.S. Dep't of State, supra. Instead, the response to terrorism
has traditionally been grounded in law enforcement and military responses, rather than in hu-
man rights initiatives. See Cressey, supra; U.S. Dep't of State, supra.
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and democratic reform, and addressing major political grievances all
imply the stand alone human rights model. Respect for civil liberties
and human rights implies the integrated human rights model. These
recommendations not only call for a holistic approach, they also ex-
press the importance of human rights as a tool for fighting terrorism.
A review of the links between human rights jurisprudence and ter-
rorism reveals the importance of the human rights model. In much the
same way as international criminal law emerged in the last half of the
twentieth century "built on developments in international law ... par-
ticularly in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law,"3 the
twenty-first century struggle against terrorism requires a solid founda-
tion in human rights. The links between human rights jurisprudence
and terrorism include the effects of terrorism on human rights, the
classification of terrorism as a human rights violation, the human
rights implications of defining terrorism, the value of a holistic ap-
proach toward terrorism, and the applicability of human rights norms
to traditional strategies to combat terrorism.
III. THE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The relevance of terrorism to human rights is profound. Even
viewed under competing conceptual schemata, terrorism has a detri-
mental impact on human rights. Kalliopi Koufa, the Special Rappor-
teur for the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights (Special Rapporteur) has stated, "[T]here is probably
not a single human right exempt from the impact of terrorism."31 Not
only do terrorist groups deprive individuals of their human rights, they
drive states to take counter-terrorism measures, which also serve to
denigrate human rights.32 Thus, the pervasive impact of terrorism on
human rights can be seen both directly and indirectly. 33
The direct impact of terrorism is clearly illustrated by its immedi-
ate consequences. These consequences usually fall into three catego-
ries of violations: the right to "life, liberty, and dignity of the individ-
30. Philippe Sands, Preface to FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at x (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).
31. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
Terrorism and Human Rights: Progress Report, T 102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31
(June 27, 2001) [hereinafter Progress Report] (prepared by Kalliopi K. Koufa).
32. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights: Second Progress Report, In 52-58, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/35 (July 17, 2002) [hereinafter Second Progress Report] (prepared by
Kalliopi K. Koufa).
33. Progress Report, supra note 31, U 104-120.
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ual; . . . [the right to a] [d]emocratic society; and ... [rights relating
to] [s]ocial peace and public order. '34 Terrorist acts include, but are
not limited to, murder, kidnapping, and seriously injuring innocent
parties, which all deny victims their human rights to life, liberty, and
dignity."5 Terrorists seek to impose their will not only on states but
also upon the individuals in those states.36 The unwillingness of ter-
rorists to submit to the democratic process and their attempts to thwart
or disrupt that process are attempts to overthrow the democratic rights
of the individuals in that state.37 The actions of terrorists not only de-
prive individuals of their rights to life, liberty, dignity, and democracy,
but also foster an atmosphere of fear and dread that devastate social
peace and public order.38 In this atmosphere, countermeasures and
other precautions, which are perceived as safeguards, impede the es-
sential functions of the social order and lead to inefficiency, lower
standards of living, mutual distrust, and a fearful, brutish lifestyle.
The global community has not failed to take note of the rise in ter-
rorism. Specifically in response to the egregious terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United Nations has recognized:
[T]he need to strengthen international, cooperation among States
and international and regional organizations to prevent, combat and
eliminate international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
wherever it is committed and whoever the perpetrators, since no na-
tion on its own is in a position to fight and eliminate the global evil
of terrorism.39
In this light, the United Nations passed Resolution 1373, estab-
lishing the Counter-Terrorism Comnmittee. 4 In addition to the United
Nations, states and other intergovernmental organizations have
stepped up their counter-terrorism law enforcement activities. For ex-
ample, Interpol established the 9/11 Clearinghouse to facilitate coop-
34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Terrorism and Human Rights: Preliminary Report, 18, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Preliminary Report] (prepared by Kalliopi
K. Koufa).
35. See id. 53.
36. See id. [ 24, 32.
37. Id. T 32, 36.
38. Id. T 33.
39. The Secretary-General, Strengthening International Cooperation and Technical As-
sistance in Preventing and Combating Terrorism, 1, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/59/187 (July 30, 2004).
40. S.C. Res. 1373, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also Counter-
Terrorism Comm., Mandate, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/comnittees/1373/ (last visited Jan.
20, 2006). The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) consists of the fifteen members of the
U.N. Security Council and "tries to increase the capability of States to fight terrorism." Id.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss2/2
2006] A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO COUNTER-TERRORISM 261
eration and information sharing between national law enforcement
agencies and adopted a resolution calling for improved information
sharing between member countries.4' The European Union (EU)
passed a plethora of post 9/11 anti-terrorist measures, 42 and the United
Kingdom enacted the Anti-Terrorist Crime and Security Bill.43 How-
ever, terrorism can have another, indirect impact as a consequence of
such counter-terrorist law enforcement measures when the measures
themselves pose a principle threat to human rights.
The indirect impact of terrorism stems from overly intrusive, reac-
tionary, counter-terrorist measures. Terrorist acts frequently provoke
states into overreacting by implementing serious breaches of human
rights and freedoms. These terrorist-instigated state actions may be
41. Interpol, Terrorist Attack of 11 September 2001, G.A. Res. AG-2001-RES-05 (Sept.
28, 2001), available at http://www.interpol.intIPublic/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/AGN70/Reso-
lutions/AGN70RES5.asp. The resolution also reiterates its commitment to the Cairo Declara-
tion Against Terrorism "and calls for enhanced international police and judicial collaboration
to tackle terrorism ... by exploring opportunities to co-ordinate legal, judicial and operational
approaches ... ." Id.
42. See generally European Union, Counter-Terrorism: The European Union's Actions
in 2006, http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/EURespUSTerror.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2006); European Union, Counter-Terrorism: The European Union's Actions in 2001,
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/2001EURespUSTerror.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2006). Shortly after 9/11, the EU adopted four acts to combat terrorism. European Un-
ion, Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/CounActs
Dec27.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (referring to Council Regulation 2580/2001, 2001 O.J.
(L 344) 70 (EC), Council Decision 2001/927, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 83 (EC), Council Common
Position 2001/930, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 90 (EU), and Council Common Position 2001/931,
2001 O.J. (L 344) 93 (EU)). In addition, the EU engaged scientific experts "to combat bio-
logical and chemical terrorism;" provided for greater information sharing between Europol
and the United States; reviewed the balance of security and refugee rights; coordinated civil
protection, including the formation of a European Chief of Police Task Force; provided emer-
gency insurance aid to airlines; created new security rules for air transportation; and ad-
dressed issues such as arrest warrants and money-laundering. Id. The EU also examined
anti-Islamic reactions to 9/11 and the impact of terrorism on financial services. See id. Fur-
thermore, the EU increased security at ports, airports, and power plants. See id.
43. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 1-129, scheds. 1-8 (Eng.).
See also id. explanatory n. 1. This legislation was passed in direct response to 9/11 and was
intended to:
" Cut off terrorist funding
" Ensure that government departments and agencies [could] collect and share informa-
tion required for countering the terrorist threat
" Streamline relevant immigration procedures
* Ensure the security of the nuclear and aviation industries
" Improve the security of dangerous substances that may be targeted or used by terror-
ists
" Extend police powers available to relevant forces
* Ensure that [the U.K. could] meet [its] European obligations in the area of police and
judicial co-operation and [its] international obligations to counter bribery and corruption
9 Update parts of the UK's anti-terrorist powers[.]
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undertaken in good faith or they may serve as a pretext for states to
further their own agendas. For example, on the day after the 9/11 at-
tack, the U.S. National Coordinator for Security and Counter-
Terrorism, Richard Clarke, observed:
I expected to go back to a round of meetings examining what the
next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could
do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of
discussions about Iraq. At first I was incredulous that we were talk-
in& about something other than getting al Qaeda. Then I realized
with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz
were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to pro-
mote their agenda about Iraq.'
In addition, as one commentator has suggested, Palestinian suicide
bombers "provide the perfect cover for the Israeli government's daily
incursions into Palestinian territory, the perfect excuse for old-
fashioned, nineteenth-century colonialism, dressed up as new-
fashioned, twenty-first century war."45
Whether the responses to terrorist activities are sincere or con-
trived, the impact on human rights is nonetheless widespread. After
9/11, the U.S. and international response was devastating. According
to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2003:
Government policies adopted after the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 profoundly altered the human rights landscape...
2002 was marked by significant steps backward on human rights.
The arbitrary detention of non-citizens, secret deportation hearings
for persons suspected of connections to terrorism, the authorization
of military commissions to try non-citizen terrorists [suspects], the
failure to abide by the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of de-
tainees held by the United States in Cuba, and the military deten-
tion without charge or access to counsel of U.S. citizens designated
as "enemy combatants," were among the U.S. actions that indicated
the failure of the Bush administration to respect human rights .... 46
These actions also included expanded powers for secret search and
seizures by police, detention of suspects for up to seven days without
charges, and increased authority for widespread phone tapping.47 In
the domestic debate between the preservation of civil liberties and the
44. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 30.
45. ARUNDHATI Roy, WARTALK61 (2003).
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: UNITED STATES,
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/us.htmi.
47. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56
(2001).
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use of allegedly more effective means of combating terrorism, the
Center for Constitutional Rights opined:
The War on Terror has seriously compromised the First, Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of citizens and non-citizens
alike. From the USA PATRIOT Act's over-broad definition of
domestic terrorism, to the FBI's new powers of search and surveil-
lance, to the indefinite detention of both citizens and non-citizens
without formal charges, the principles of free speech, due process,
and equal protection under the law have been seriously under-
mined. 8
These developments represent a failure to integrate human rights scru-
tiny within the law enforcement model.
Additionally, 9/11 resulted in a fundamental policy shift with re-
gard to U.S. military aid. The new criteria emphasized the worldwide
"war on terrorism" at the cost of international human rights. Previ-
ously, countries engaged in massive human rights violations had been
denied U.S. military aid, but "[t]he modifications in the U.S. foreign
military assistance program make it easier for known violators to ac-
quire the tools of abuse, thus implicating the United States in abuses
that result. '4 9 Moreover, the United States has drastically enlarged its
spending on military aid pursuant to the "war on terrorism." This new
policy has "degraded human rights policy by lifting sanctions on arms
transfers to countries with poor human rights records and by cutting
required approval times for such transfers."5 While the United States
is cutting military aid to traditional democratic allies,5 it has been lift-
48. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: ONE YEAR
LATER, EROSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE POST 9/11 ERA 1 (2001), available at
httpJ/www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/CivilLiberties.pdf.
49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DANGEROUS DEALINGS-CHANGES TO US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 2 (2002), available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2002/usmil/USass0202.pdf. For a detailed accounting of changes in military aid and the hu-
man rights abuses attributed to recipients, see Fed'n of American Scientists, "The War on
Terrorism" and Human Rights: Aid to Abusers, http://fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/
Aid&Humanrights.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
50. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Military Aid After 9/11 Threatens Hu-
man Right (Feb. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release, Human Rights Watch], available at
http:/hrw.org/english/docs/2002/02/15/usint3750_txt.htm (referring to HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 49).
51. The U.S. ban on military aid to traditional allies and the initiation of aid to nations
with infamous human rights records is not tied to the "war on terrorism." Instead, it is tied to
the latter nations' willingness to endorse bilateral agreements granting immunity from the ju-
risdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). See Remigius Chibueze, United States
Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring Free-
dom," 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 19, 50-51 (2003); cf. American Servicemembers' Pro-
tection Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2007 (restricting military aid to states that are
parties to the ICC). Ironically, the ICC may be instrumental in the eradication of global ter-
15
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ing bans on military aid to states with particularly heinous human
rights records, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Oman, and the Philip-
pines.52 Within the military paradigm, provision of military aid to na-
tions with a common goal of eradicating terrorism is a valid practice
for developing state preventive capacity, but not if the aid is be used to
perpetrate greater human rights abuses and stimulate greater resent-
ment.
The "war on terrorism" has led to other human rights violations
directly attributable to the United States, most notably violations of
the Geneva Convention in Iraq. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) repeatedly warned U.S. military authorities to re-
frain from serious breaches of the Geneva Convention, issuing a re-
port that documented numerous examples of torture and degradation
perpetrated against Iraqi detainees. 3 In addition to the humiliating and
degrading treatment noted in the world press, the ICRC documented
misuses of lethal force that lead to deaths and injuries; confiscation of
personal property; deprivation of food and clothing; "threats . . .
against members of [detainees'] families (in particular wives and
daughters); hooding; tight handcuffing; use of stress positions (kneel-
ing, squatting, standing with arms raised over the head) for three or
four hours; striking [detainees] with rifle butts, slaps, punches, pro-
longed exposure to the sun, and isolation in dark cells. ' 'M One de-
tainee "alleged that he had been ... urinated on, kicked in the head,
lower back and groin, force-fed a baseball which was secured to his
rorism. See Chibueze, supra, at 23-24. Moreover, unilateral action by the United States has
damaged its relations with other allies and may result in decreased cooperation in the investi-
gation and apprehension of terrorists. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the
Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 21
WIs. INT'L L. J. 557, 559-60 (2003).
52. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 50.
53. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND
OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST,
INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (2004), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili-
tary/library/report/2004/icrcjreport-iraqfeb2004.htm. The ICRC Report was first printed
publicly by the Wall Street Journal on May 7, 2004. See David S. Cloud et al., Red Cross
Found Widespread Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2004, at Al. The ICRC
began monitoring the conditions in Iraq beginning in March 2003 and found that "ill-
treatment during capture was frequent," concluding that the abuses took place at multiple
times and locations including Baghdad, Basra, Ramadi, and Tikrit. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, supra. The ICRC conducted twenty-nine visits in fourteen detention facilities, and, at
the end of each visit, ICRC personnel "[held] a final talk with the detaining authorities to in-
form them about the ICRC's findings and recommendations." Id. In February 2004, the
ICRC completed its report, detailing numerous violations, and submitted it to the Coalition
Forces. Id.
54. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 53.
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mouth by a scarf and deprived of sleep for four consecutive days....
An ICRC medical examination revealed [the detainee had] hematoma
in the lower back, blood in [his] urine, sensory loss ... and a broken
rib. '55  Some detainees received only women's underwear to wear,
and others were "paraded naked outside cells in front of other persons
deprived of their liberty, and guards, sometimes hooded or with
women's underwear over the head" and photographed.5 6 Other de-
tainees were kept in compounds where they were vulnerable to shell-
ing or were given hazardous duty.57 In one instance, two detainees
each had to have both legs amputated and a third detainee had to have
one leg amputated after all three were injured by an exploding cluster
bomb.58 The ICRC also reported abuses by the Iraqi police, including
cigarette burns, electric shocks administered to detainees who were
doused with water, threats of raping a detainee's wife, and mock exe-
cutions. 59  Detainees' allegations of these tortuous practices by the
United States were supported by statements from military intelligence
personnel and by medical evidence, such as injuries, scars, psycho-
logical symptoms, medical reports, and autopsies. 60
These devastating human rights consequences of the "war on ter-
rorism" have been decried by human rights organizations. In 2005,
Amnesty International USA took the unprecedented step of calling
upon nations around the world to investigate U.S. officials and, where
applicable, prosecute them.61 Specifically, they called upon 125 states
to use their domestic legislation to exercise extra-territorial authority,
or universal jurisdiction, to investigate and prosecute Bush administra-
tion officials for jus cogens violations of the Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment62 and violations of the Geneva Conventions. 63 These allegations
stem from U.S. activities in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l USA, Annual Report: Selective U.S. Prosecutions in
Torture Scandal Underscore International Obligation to Investigate U.S. Officials, Charges
Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter Press Release, Amnesty Int'l USA].
62. Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
63. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l USA, supra note 61.
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as well as the rendition of suspects for interrogation to other states that
practice torture.64
The domestic and international consequences of the U.S. "war on
terrorism" echo some of the findings of the Preliminary Report of the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
in which the Special Rapporteur has amassed a huge, yet admittedly
incomplete, list of the ways in which terrorism indirectly impacts the
right to a democratic society. It can:
undermine the legitimate authority of Governments; influence ideo-
logical and political factors in order to impose its own model of so-
ciety; impede citizens in thei use of their rights to have a say in thedecisions that affect their lives; subvert pluralism and democraticinstitutions through the creation of negative conditions for the func-
tioning of the constitution;e.. undermine free political, economic,
social and cultural development; impair the quality of democratic
society for all, even when it does not actually threaten its survival;[and] lead to more terrorism and militancy 65
Whether the actors are characterized as "terrorists" or "freedomfighters," regardless of justification or moral equivalence, the acts
themselves, directly or indirectly, result in attacks on human rights.
Frequently, the counter-terronsm response is equally damaging. This
realization is not lost upon the United Nations. The evolution of theUnited Nations' understanding of the link between terrorism and hu-
man rights is evinced by the actions it has taken in recent years to
combat this problem. In addition to the High-level Panel on Threats
Challenges and Change and the "five Ds," the United Nations' human
rights bodies have mobilized against terrorism and the accompanying
over-reaching counter-terrorist measures. 66 It has reactivated the ad
hoc body of the Sixth Committee to define terrorism, 67 and established
a Counter-Terrorist Committee to monitor the implementation of Se-
curity Council Resolution 1373.68 U.N. human rights bodies, as well
as relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activists,
64. Cf Press Release, Amnesty Int'l USA, Annual Report: Americas Regional Over-
view 2004, http'/www.anesty usa.orglannualreportamericas.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006)
(condemning the United States for failing "to apply the Geneva Conventions to those captured
during the international armed conflict in Afghanistan and transferred to the US naval base at
Guantnamo Bay, Cuba").
65. Preliminary Report, supra note 34, t o 32.
66. See generally Second Progress Report, supra note 32,19 21-34.
67. Id. a 23. Thus far, despite the proposal of the High-level Panel, th e of an im-
mutable universally accepted definition remains unresolved and continues to hamper the goal
of an inclusive assault on terrorism that combines sensitivity to its root causes as well as its
devastating impact on human rights.
68. Counter-Terrorism Comm., supra note 40.
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have sought to keep counter-terrorist measures in check by addressing
such issues as the definition of international terrorism, the scope of
humanitarian law, the principle of non-refoulement, and safeguards
against impunity.69 Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated on January
18, 2002, "While we certainly need vigilance to prevent acts of terror-
ism,... it will be self-defeating if we sacrifice other key priorities-
such as human rights-in the process. '"70
IV. TERRORISM AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION
Argentina has stated "that it does not accept the argument that the
acts of international terrorism constitute a human rights violation,
since, by definition, only States are capable of violating human
rights."' 7' This position reflects the traditional positivist legal view of
terrorism, which relegates terrorism and human rights issues solely to
domestic political scrutiny.72 However, due to evolving perspectives
on terrorism, this traditional view is changing to reflect a more inclu-
sive understanding not only of how to combat terrorism but also of the
scope of human rights law. This change poses the question "whether
human rights law is actually moving beyond the traditional dichotomy
of individual versus State and towards the creation of obligations ap-
plicable also to non-State entities. 73
The controversy over whether human rights law applies to non-
state entities stems from disagreements over characterizations of both
terrorism and human rights. First, the traditional view does not recog-
nize international terrorism as a human rights violation because it as-
sumes that only non-state actors can be international terrorists.74 This
approach reflects a positivist doctrine, grounded in a zealous defense
of domestic jurisdiction, that consequently places only limited respon-
69. Second Progress Report, supra note 32, 24.
70. The Secretary-General, United Nations, Address to the Security Council (Jan. 18,
2002), quoted in The Secretary-General, Report of the Policy Working Group on the United
Nations and Terrorism, annex T 27, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. A/57/273/S/2002/875 (Aug. 6, 2002), available at http://www.un.dk/
doc/documents.htm (follow "A/57/273/S/2002/875" hyperlink).
71. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular Terrorism, T 2,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP. l/Add.2 (Aug. 8, 2003) (prepared by Kalliopi K. Koufa).
72. See id. 4.
73. Preliminary Report, supra note 34, 17 (citing U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-
Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Human Rights, Terrorism and Human
Rights: Working Paper, 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/28 (June 26, 1997) (prepared by
Kalliopi Koufa)).
74. See id.
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sibility on the international community for human rights policing and
the control of terrorism. In contrast, the emerging trend embraces
changing global circumstances and lends itself to a more inclusive
definition that calls for greater international scrutiny and binding state
obligations, eschewing a strictly domestic jurisdictional basis. Thus,
the traditional view neglects the enigma of state-sponsored terrorism.
As disparate terrorist entities forge alliances and address common re-
gional or ideological perceptions, they find refuge within the borders
of friendly states that share common perspectives. Though giving aid
to terrorism, these states are not actively engaged in human rights vio-
lations, and the traditional view fails to account adequately for their
complicity.75 Dogmatic adherence to the traditional view fails to rec-
ognize globalization and the emergence of new power struggles, and
is giving way due to these changed circumstances.
The traditional view postulates that human rights violations are
domestic in nature because, absent war, states have no capability of
authoring such acts on other peoples. Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter
acknowledges the primacy of sovereign equality,76 and Article 2(7)
mandates that the United Nations shall not interfere with matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.7 7 Arguably, these provi-
sions have established jurisdictional distinctions relegating the role of
the United Nations to matters of purely international scope and pre-
cluding it from intervening in domestic issues. Therefore, states have
traditionally had a greater perceived insulation from international
75. However, state exemption from responsibility for state-sponsored terrorism is con-
tradictory even under the traditional scheme. In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly passed
Resolution 3314, defining aggression. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). According to the definition, aggression includes
"[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." Id. art. 3(g). This definition closely
resembles modem state-sponsored terrorism. Since aggression may be classified as a human
rights violation and state-sponsored terrorism is aggression for which states are responsible,
the obvious conclusion is that terrorism is a human rights violation for which states are re-
sponsible. The more difficult question concerns the nexus between the state and any terror-
ism organization it harbors. Even when a terrorist organization acts independently of a spon-
soring state, as when it does not specifically receive orders from the state, the state would
probably still be liable for a human rights violation under a conspiracy theory, according to
the General Assembly's definition of aggression.
76. U.N. Charter, supra note 10, art. 2(1) ("The organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
77. Id. art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VUI.").
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oversight with respect to their domestic adherence to human rights
norms. However, Article 2(7) also allows for the fiat of Chapter VII
in cases where international security is threatened, as in threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.78 The emerging
trend recognizes that terrorism and human rights have become global
issues and therefore their impact transcends national boundaries.79
The Executive Summary of the report of the High-level Panel relates,
"In today's world, a threat to one is a threat to all. Globalization
means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the industrial world
would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions in
the developing world. ' '8° The Secretary-General reiterated this posi-
tion by citing World Bank statistics, which assert, "[T]he attacks of
September 1 1 th 2001 [sic] cost more than $80 billion dollars and
pushed 1 lm [sic] people in developing countries into poverty."-81
Moreover, emerging trends reveal how human rights have taken on
global proportions, even when violations occur entirely within the
border of a single sovereign state. Events in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda in the 1990s reveal an expanded notion of the role of in-
ternational organizations and other states in domestic human rights is-
sues. The High-level Panel's report further elaborates, "When a State
fails to protect its civilians, the international community then has a
further responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, moni-
toring missions and diplomatic pressure-and with force if necessary,
though only as a last resort. 8 2
Second, by limiting human rights violations to state actors,
thereby rendering them domestic issues, the traditional view ensures
that the international human rights machinery does not focus on viola-
tions perpetrated by international terrorists. Viewing international ter-
rorist activity through a domestic lens and relying exclusively on local
law enforcement is a practice that vitiates the primacy of international
control and diminishes international authority. Moreover, some states
may favor the traditional view for reasons other than positivism.
State-sponsored terrorism allows countries to conduct hostilities
against other states by encouraging and assisting select international
78. Id.
79. A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 4, at 1.
80. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 1.
81. Annan, Courage to Fulfill Our Responsibilities, supra note 11. The Secretary-
General adds, "Given the relationship between poverty and infant mortality, we would count
the cost of a ... terrorist attack in a rich country in two terrible death tolls: in the attacked
city, and in poor nations all over the world." Id.
82. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 4.
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terrorist groups incurring a reduced risk of war and theoretically,
without raising the ire and retribution of international institutions.83
Other states, though not sponsoring terrorist groups, may nonetheless
be sympathetic to the agendas and ideals that terrorists espouse. It fol-
lows that such states might adhere to the traditional view in order to
avoid heightened international scrutiny of their complicity in terrorist
acts.
However, the evolution of human rights treaty law has partly
caused a change to the interpretation and implementation of the safe-
guard afforded states in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter. This change
has also been caused by customary international law, which arguably
allows for international oversight, greater access, and authority to in-
vestigate allegations of internal human rights violations. "[T]he basic
duty of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states has been sub-
ject to a process of reinterpretation in the human rights field since
1945, so that states can no longer plead it successfully as a bar. ... "I
In addition to the explosion of human rights jurisprudence in the latter
half of the twentieth century and the reinterpretation of the jurisdiction
of international organizations, other developments have rendered at-
tempts to divorce terrorist acts from human rights law counterproduc-
tive and out of step with contemporary understandings.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a
period of unprecedented international cooperation at the end of the last
century. Among other things, this cooperation led to the reaffirmation
of the principles of Nuremberg and Tokyo, namely personal liability
of state leaders for offenses carried out in their official capacity. The
formation of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugosla-
via, the International Criminal Court, and the hybrid courts in Sierra
Leone and East Timor reveal a new commitment to the international
exercise of jurisdiction over criminal behavior constituting human
rights violations.85 By enlarging the role and function of international
83. The 2001 campaign in Afghanistan contradicts previous assumptions regarding the
safety of states sponsoring or otherwise providing aid to terrorist groups and reflects a break
from traditional practices. It further illustrates the new global trend calling for accountability
grounded in collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
84. Progress Report, supra note 31, 47.
85. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is located in Arusha,
United Republic of Tanzania. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The
ICTR assumes jurisdiction over criminal matters involving genocide and serious violations of
international humanitarian law that took place in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring
states between January 1 and December 31, 1994. United Nations, The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: General Information, http://65.18.216.88/default.htm (follow "About
the Tribunal" hyperlink, then "General Information" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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criminal law, the modern trend favors increasing international scrutiny
of terrorism, and, as international criminal law has its genesis in the
application of human rights and humanitarian law, human rights scru-
tiny is equally relevant to terrorism.
Furthermore, the traditional view is inconsistent with the plain
language of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Decla-
ration) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant). As previously discussed, under the traditional view of
human rights, international terrorism is not recognized as a violation
per se, because only states can violate human rights. As observed by
the Special Rapporteur, this notion seems to be at odds with the spe-
cific language of both Article 30 of the Declaration and Article 5(1) of
the Covenant.8 6 Both provisions contain language that expresses the
obligations of "any state, group or person" with respect to abstaining
from human rights violations.8 7 Inasmuch as non-state terrorists can
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is located in The
Hague. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). It has jurisdiction to hear
criminal matters occurring in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 that involve egregious viola-
tions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
and crimes against humanity. United Nations, The ICTY at a Glance: General Information,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (follow "General Information" hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2006).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is also located in The Hague. Int'l Criminal Court,
ICC at a Glance, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/history.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2006). Its jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, aggression, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity is complementary to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court arts. 1, 5(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to address "serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian and Sierra Leonan Law committed in... Sierra Leone since 30 December
1996." Special Court for Sierra Leone, About the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
http://www.sc-sl.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006); see also S.C. Res. 1315, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
The Special Panel for Serious Crimes has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity commit-
ted in East Timor. See Press Release, United Nations Transitional Admin. in East Timor
[UNTAET], Fact Sheet 7: Justice and Serious Crimes (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs7.PDF; see also S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1272 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing UNTAET as the judicial authority in East
Timor).
86. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates, "Nothing in the
present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
present Covenant." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, art.
5(1). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 30.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, art. 5(1); Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 30.
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be groups or persons, by implication they fall under the category of
potential human rights violators. The Declaration and the Covenant
are widely accepted either as binding treaty law or customary interna-
tional law and, along with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,88 are collectively known as the "Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights."89 The language in both the Declaration
and Covenant is unambiguous, and, under Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, shall be "interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning...."90
As previously indicated, the traditional view also flies in the face
of what contemporary analysis has revealed regarding state-sponsored
terrorism. International terrorism is often perpetrated at the behest of
state partners, or at least with their tacit approval. This form of terror-
ism is consistent with the states' perceived foreign policy objectives.
State-sponsored terrorism is an example of states exporting human
rights violations to other countries under the guise of international ter-
rorism. Such activity may be a form of unconventional warfare be-
tween states.9' However, this approach is criticized by others, as it al-
lows terrorist groups refuge under humanitarian law and the law of
warfare. 92 In any event, state-sponsored international terrorism blurs
the distinction between criminal activity and warfare.
88. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
89. Press Release, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, The International Bill
of Human Rights: Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1), httpJ/www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006).
90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(l), May 23, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
91. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity
with the National Security Team, (Sept. 12, 2001), http'/www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (taking the position that
the 9/11 attacks were acts of war). On September 12, 2001 President Bush declared, "The
deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more
than acts of terror. They were acts of war." Id. This statement was more than emotionally
charged hyperbole, as it also appears on an official U.S. Department of State web page under
the subtitle, "These terrorist attacks were an act of war against the United States." Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions About the War on Terror-
ism at Home and Abroad (June 11, 2002), http'/www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/10992.htm.
92. In the United States, the fear that terrorists could use humanitarian law to claim pro-
tection as prisoners of war was laid to rest by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Guantanamo Bay detainee who was purport-
edly the driver for Osama bin Laden. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35, 40 (D.C. Cir.
2005). The court found that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war as defined under the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40.
The court found the protections of the Third Geneva Convention are generally inapplicable to
24
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The history of the United Nations is consistent with a changing
worldview, as the need for international cooperation has been docu-
mented in a series of U.N. treaties and covenants since the 1950s. In
response to state-sponsored terrorism, the General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.9 3 This resolution specifically re-
quires states "to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organiza-
tion of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries, for in-
cursion into the territory of another State."'94 The United Nations has
also recognized the efficacy of international cooperation in law en-
forcement procedures against terrorism in the adoption of several in-
struments concerning aviation and maritime safety, bombing, hostage
taking, plastic explosives, and the protection of nuclear material.95
These instruments testify to an international consensus regarding the
necessity and propriety of international scrutiny of terrorist acts and
the removal of such acts from purely domestic jurisdiction.
There are three distinct periods of U.N. counter-terrorist activity
relevant to human rights enquiry. These periods are from 1972 to
1993, from 1993 to 2001, and post 9/1i. Prior to 1972, the United Na-
tions primarily focused on the safety of aircraft.96 The first stage of
significant U. N. interest in terrorism began in response to the kidnap-
ping and massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics of
1972. 97 Worldwide publicity of this raid galvanized the international
al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is neither a state, nor has it accepted the Geneva Conventions.
See id. at41.
93. Cf Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18 at 339, U.N. Doc. No. A/5217 at 121
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
94. Id. § 1. Additionally, the Friendly Relations Declaration calls upon states "to re-
frain from "organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards
the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a
threat or use of force." Id.
95. See supra note 13.
96. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, supra note 13, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra
note 13; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra
note 13.
97. Preliminary Report, supra note 34, 8. During the 1972 Summer Olympics, mem-
bers of the Israeli Olympic team were kidnapped by a Palestinian group called Black Septem-
ber. Absolute Astronomy Reference, Munich Massacre, http:/www.absoluteastronomy.com/
encyclopedia/m/mu/munichmassacre.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). Eleven of the athletes
were killed along with five kidnappers and one German police officer. Id. Later, a German
jet was hijacked with demands for the release of the three surviving Black September mem-
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community where three wars and a quarter-century of strife had failed.
In response, the General Assembly passed Resolution 303498 as well
as several subsequent conventions, including those concerning diplo-
mats,99 hostage taking, 100 the physical protection of nuclear material, 101
the safety of maritime navigation,"0 and plastic explosives.103 During
this period, the question of a definition of terrorism was relegated to
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, a legal body, which
dealt with it primarily as a criminal matter. 1°4 The link of terrorism to
human rights was obscure and metaphorical.
Notwithstanding the traditional one-dimensional treatment of ter-
rorism, Resolution 3034 was provocatively titled Measures to Prevent
International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human
Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Under-
lying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence
Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which
Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own,
in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes. 105 This title evinces sympa-
thy for the accused and foreshadows both the linkage of terrorism and
human rights and the continuing debate over a definition of terrorism.
However, Resolution 3034 fails to take either international terrorism
or state-sponsored terrorism into account. 1°6 It also deals with terror-
ism as a domestic issue, wrestling with the question of balancing the
competing interests of domestic self-determination with the orderly
rule of legitimate government."°7
bers. Id. Israel retaliated to the Munich Massacre by bombing Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) bases in Syria and Lebanon and by setting up a special Mossad hit team that
"eliminated" members of Black September and the PLO in Algeria, Cyprus, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Lebanon, Libya, Norway, and Sweden. See id.
98. See G.A. Res. 3034, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. X, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (Dec.
18, 1972). Resolution 3034 was noticeably sensitive to the root causes of terrorism. Id. art. 2.
It also reflected a pronounced sympathy for the self-determination of people and called for
states to recognize human rights and become parties to international conventions relating to
terrorism. Id. arts. 4-6.
99. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 13.
100. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 13.
101. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note 13.
102. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, supra note 13.
103. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, su-
pra note 13.
104. See, e.g., Sixth Committee Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/44/L.2 (Sept. 26,
1989).
105. G.A. Res. 3034, supra note 98.
106. See id.
107. See id. I 3-4.
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The second period of U.N. counter-terrorist activity resulted from
the remarkable world conference on human rights that took place in
1993 and produced the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(Vienna Declaration). 8 Paragraph 17 of the Vienna Declaration ex-
plicitly asserted the link between terrorism and human rights for the
first time by affirming that terrorist acts "aim[] at the destruction of
human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening terri-
torial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately consti-
tuted Governments."t 9 This assertion mandates that terrorism is a po-
litical and international issue and no longer merely a domestic
criminal matter. Some of the conventions and resolutions ratified dur-
ing this period reflect a more sophisticated approach to terrorism, such
as the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism"10
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism.1 ' Another signature development during this period
was the proliferation of conventions adopted by the regional organiza-
tions in developing areas, such as the League of Arab States" 2 and the
108. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration]. The Vienna Declaration expressed the exuberance of a post-Cold War opti-
mism when it recognized "the major changes taking place on the international scene and the
aspirations of all the peoples ...." Id. The Vienna Declaration not only cemented the link
between human rights and terrorism but also reemphasized the universality of human rights.
See id. I I ("The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.") The
Declaration states, "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interre-
lated," and "[t]he international community must treat human rights globally ...." Id. T1 5.
These provisions recognize expanded international jurisdiction and thereby inexorably lead to
heightened international scrutiny of domestic human rights issues. By also linking human
rights to terrorism, the Vienna Declaration calls for heightened international scrutiny of ter-
rorist activities. Id. 17. Thus, the Vienna Declaration represents a combination of previ-
ously independent trends in counter-terrorism and human rights that collectively strengthen
and mature.
109. Id. T 17.
110. See Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). This resolution "encouraged [States] to urgently review the
scope of existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination
of terrorism... with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework cov-
ering all aspects of the matter. Id. 5(e).
111. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 13.
112. Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 13. The Arab Con-
vention for the Suppression of Terrorism asserts that Islamic Shari'a law condemns terrorism
and reiterates the parties' commitment to their obligations under the U.N. Charter, the Pact of
the League of Arab States, and other international agreements. Id. pmbl. The Convention
distinguishes between terrorist activities and struggles for self-determination. See id. art. 2. It
also pledges member state cooperation and coordination in investigation and extradition of
terrorists. Id arts. 3-38.
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Organization of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Un-
ion (AU)."13
The third period of U.N. counter-terrorism activity resulted from
the dramatic and tragic attacks that occurred in the United States on
9/11. After the attacks, the Security Council passed Resolutions
1368 " and 137311 and the General Assembly adopted Resolution
A/56/1." 6 Resolutions 1368 and 1373 designated acts of international
terrorism threats to international peace and security as defined in
Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter."17 Articles 41 and 42 of that Chapter
authorize the Security Council to call on states to sever diplomatic
ties, to impose economic sanctions, and to intervene militarily in re-
113. Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, supra note 13. Ac-
cording to the current chairperson of the AU Commission, this convention reflects "the im-
perative need to combat and eradicate the phenomenon of terrorism through a comprehensive
approach that addresses its root causes." Alpha Oumar Konar6, Preventing and Combating
Terrorism in Africa, http://www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/terrorism2.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2006).
114. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
115. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40.
116. Condemnation of Terrorists Attacks in the United States of America, G.A. Res.
56/1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/1 (Sept. 18,2001).
117. See id.; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 114; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40. Unlike
General Assembly Resolution 56, Security Council Resolution 1368 implies that terrorist ac-
tions may rise to the level of "threats to the international peace and security" and recognizes
"the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter."
S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 114. Compare id. with G.A. Res. 56/1, supra note 116. These
provisions refer to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Articles 39 and 51. U.N. Charter, supra
note 10, arts. 39, 51. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to make a determination re-
garding threats to peace and security and acts of aggression. In conjunction with Articles 41
and 42, it empowers the Security Council to take steps to remove the threat, including sever-
ing diplomatic relations, imposing economic sanctions, and initiating military action. See id.
arts. 39, 41-42; infra note 118. Therefore, by articulating the 9/11 terrorist attack as a threat
to international peaceand security, Security Council Resolution 1368 authorizes the potential
use of military force against its perpetrators, al-Qaeda and its potential conspirators. More-
over, Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations .... " U.N. Charter, supra note 10, art. 51. Thus, Resolution 1368 arguably also al-
lowed the United States to take unilateral military action in response to 9/11.
However, Article 51 only permits unilateral military action "until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace," U.N. Charter, supra note 10 art.
51, and would scarcely serve as a justification for the largely unilateral attack of Iraq nearly
two years later, particularly as there has never been any demonstrable nexus between 9/11 and
Iraq. Nevertheless, Article 51 might have served to justify an attack on Afghanistan, indi-
vidually or collectively, a few months after 9/11, because Resolution 1373, adopted approxi-
mately two weeks after 1368, reaffirmed both the categorization of the 9/11 attacks as threats
to international peace and security and the right to individual and collective self-defense. See
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40. Resolution 1373 also asserts the need to "combat by all
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts," referring to the diplomatic, economic, and military
"means" laid out in the Charter's Articles 41 and 42. Id; U.N. Charter, supra note 10, arts.
41-42; infra note 118.
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sponse to threats to the peace." l' In addition, Resolution 1368 stresses
the responsibility of states that host terrorist organizations, stating,
"[T]hose responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpe-
trators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable
.... ," 9 When read in conjunction with Resolution 1373, which in-
cludes a long list of counter-terrorist measures, including freezing as-
sets, refraining from assisting terrorist groups, exchanging pertinent
information, and assisting in enforcement procedures, this resolution
creates an affirmative duty on member states to not only refrain from
supporting terrorist activities, but also to actively participate in the
struggle against terrorism.120 Moreover, these resolutions not only
strengthen the law enforcement model but also validate the limited use
of military force for counter-terrorism efforts under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.
118. U.N. Charter, supra note 10, art. 41-42. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter states, "The
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon the Members of the United Na-
tions to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, air postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communica-
tion, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id. Article 42 states, "Should the Security
Council consider the measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved
to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the Members of the United
Nations." Id. art. 42.
119. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 114,13.
120. Compare id. with S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40. Resolution 1373 mandates "that
all States shall.., prevent and suppress financing of terrorist acts;" criminalize collection of
funds for terrorist activities, freeze funds of persons who participate in terrorist activities, and
prohibit the donation of funds to terrorist groups. Id I 1 (emphasis added). Furthermore,
Resolution 1373 states "that all States shall.., refrain from providing any form of support" to
terrorists, "take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts .... deny safe ha-
ven" to terrorists or those who conspire with them, ensure that conspirators are also brought to
justice, provide assistance in connection with terrorist investigations, and provide effective
border control to prevent movement of terrorists or terrorist groups. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
By using the language "shall," these provisions create an affirmative obligation on U.N.
member states that precludes any claims of neutrality. U.N. member states must conform
their domestic legislation to adhere to Resolution 1373. The language in Resolution 1373 is
in sharp contrast to other declarations and resolutions that "call upon States" to combat terror-
ism or "encourage, support or affirm" counter-terrorism measures. See, e.g., Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/110, IN 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/1 10 (Feb.
2, 2000). By using the imperative, Resolution 1373 carries an implicit threat and suggests
that failure to comply with its mandate may result in punitive action. What kind of punitive
action, if any, remains to be seen. However, reference to President Bush's refrain of "either
you're with us or you're against us" certainly leads to the conclusion that States who opt for
neutrality may be treated comparably to States who sponsor terrorism. See Eric Schmitt, A
Nation Challenged: Bush Tells Iran Not to Undercut Afghan Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2002, at Al.
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Parallel to the adoption of instruments regarding terrorism, the
United Nations has developed a body of human rights law consisting
of six core treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which recognize all of the rights and freedoms terrorists seek to tram-
ple. '2 In addition, regional organizations have established human
rights courts in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. 22 These courts re-
view human rights cases and have the authority to overturn the domes-
tic courts of the states that have accepted their contentious jurisdic-
tion.123 Together, these courts have established a body of case law and
legal opinions that have exponentially enriched the recognized juris-
prudence of international human rights law. Furthermore, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee has rendered its own legal opinions in cases
brought before it by complainants,1 24 and the International Court of
Justice has rendered opinions at the behest of both states and the U.N.
General Assembly regarding human rights law.1 25 All of these sources
121. United Nations, Human Rights in Action, http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/ac-
tion.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). The six core human rights treaties are the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, the Convention Against Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, supra note 62, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 88, and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, S. EXEc. Doc. C, 95-2, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
122. See Council of Eur., European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2006); Afr. Comm'n on Human and People's Rights, History,
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/history-en.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006); Inter-Am.
Court of Human Rights, General Information, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/gen-
eraljing/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
123. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Estab-
lishment of an African Court of Human and People's Rights art. 3, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (111); American Convention on Human Rights art. 62(1),
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46(1), Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S.
222.
124. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17,
arts. 28-45; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Human Rights Committee, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006). In addition to the Human Rights Committee, three other U.N. human
rights bodies, the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on Migrant Workers
(CMW), and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) are compe-
tent to hear individual complaints. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Human Rights Bodies-Complaints Procedures, http://www.ohchr.orglenglish/bodies/
petitions/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
125. Int'l Court of Justice, General Information, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). The Interna-
tional Court of Justice is a principle organ of the United Nations. U.N. Charter, supra note
10, arts. 92-96; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3
Bevans 1153.
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transcend national boundaries and have contributed to the develop-
ment and enlargement of international human rights jurisprudence.
In 1993, the Vienna Declaration served as a junction between in-
ternational counter-terrorist law and human rights law. Paragraph 17
of the Vienna Declaration explicitly linked terrorism with human
rights and reflected emerging acceptance of greater international scru-
tiny and state responsibility.'26 International criminal tribunals,
formed since the 1990s, further evince the development of the link be-
tween terrorism and human rights law in that they have competence to
hear such matters as crimes against humanity.'27 In addition, regional
human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS), have con-
cluded that terrorism should be addressed by the jurisprudence of in-
ternational law, international human rights law, and international
humanitarian law. 128 More recently, the link between terrorism and
human rights has been reflected in the High-level Panel's recommen-
dations. The fight against terrorism is no longer a domestic criminal
matter, but a global human rights issue. The report of the High-level
Panel reflects another milestone in the convergence between human
rights instruments and counter-terrorism and re-asserts the necessary
commitment to human rights when addressing terrorism.
The sharp increase in international terrorism in the last thirty
years, the sponsorship of terrorism by at least some so-called "rogue"
states and the nefariously efficient and deadly means modern technol-
ogy has provided to terrorist factions have led to a new emerging
worldview. Coupled with dramatic advances in the law of human
rights, this emerging worldview recognizes terrorism as an interna-
tional scourge against human rights and allows for a global response
that imposes greater scrutiny and state responsibility. Unfortunately,
the domestic response to terrorism has been largely based on the law
enforcement and military models, frequently at the cost of human
rights. While some discussion of "winning the hearts and minds" of
the disaffected has been expressed, it is not a bedrock assumption of
counter-terrorism policy. A human rights model, integrated or stand-
alone, has not been incorporated into policy consistent with modern
trends and the changing worldview. In light of the human rights alle-
126. Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, 1 17.
127. See Amnesty Int'l, International Criminal Tribunals, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/
ict-index-eng (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
128. INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON TERRORISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 9 18, OEA/Ser.L/V/116/Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., (2002), available at http://www.cidh.
oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm.
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gations recently made against the United States, and absent a real fi-
nancial and tactical commitment to human rights, the "war on terror-
ism" may prove counterproductive. Furthermore, as the debate con-
cerning a definition of terrorism has lagged and failed to reflect the
predominant role of human rights, terrorism continues to be defined in
law enforcement and military terms. As a result, the definition mir-
rors the immature policies that have failed to keep in step with the
emerging worldview.
V. THE QUEST FOR A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
In reviewing the potential benefit of defining terrorism, it is ad-
visable to determine if such a definition is necessary or desirable. An
inflexible, binding definition may be counterintuitive as a prejudiced
reflection of the will of the authors, or even a propaganda tool used as
a wedge to ensure the futility of compromise. If the task is impossi-
ble, then the endeavor constitutes a pointless waste of resources.
Definitions can be problematic because actors seek to postulate them
in accordance with their particular dogma without accepting or recog-
nizing the potential validity of other points of view. Currently, a gen-
erally accepted definition eludes the international community, but
consensus may be both desirable and ultimately necessary.
Some commentators suggest that, "the price of consensus on ter-
rorism has been a far-going reduction of complexity."'29 Achieving
agreement results in a definition based on the lowest common de-
nominator that is too general to be of any practical consequence. 130
However, definitions containing differing elements affect cooperation
between states. The doctrine of dual criminality requires that the act
be criminal in both states, which turns on the specific, common ele-
ments of the crime. 3' Without some consensus on a definition of ter-
rorism, extradition, exchange of information, and domestic prosecu-
tions of extraterritorial acts are therefore complicated. 132
On a larger scale, the lack of a definition diminishes the word's
use to a watered-down expression that can mean virtually anything.
Allegorically speaking, the terrorist is the new nameless enemy, which
to some may include all foreigners, immigrants, welfare recipients, or
129. Alex Schmid, "Terrorism on Trial": Terrorism--The Definitional Problem, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375,381 (2004).
130. See Leonard Weinberg et al., The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, 16
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 777 (2004).
131. Schmid, supra note 129, at 380.
132. See id.
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democrats, to name only a few. Terrorist has become the twenty-first
century equivalent of communist, a generic term of derision whether
the target perpetrates violence or just maintains a different point of
view.'33 It has entered the lexicon as a propaganda tool to label com-
peting ideologies and promote fear and bigotry. "Accusing one's po-
litical opponents of being 'terrorists' whose claims and movements
'we' in the 'civilized world' cannot afford to engage politically is an
old rhetorical device used to uneven effect by numerous colonial re-
gimes over the decades. '' 1" "Conveying criminality, illegitimacy, and
even madness, the application of [the word] terrorist shuts the door to
discussion about the stigmatized group or with them, while reinforcing
the righteousness of the labelers, justifying their agendas and mobiliz-
ing their responses."' 13 Furthermore, the dilution of the term not only
diminishes it, but also marginalizes terrorist acts and consequently the
victims of terrorism themselves. It also marginalizes the desperate
underlying conditions that lead to terrorism.
In his article, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, Mi-
chael Reisman recognizes the desirability of a definition in order to
"establish a focus."'13 6 Reisman articulates the core difficulty of arriv-
ing at a generally accepted definition by acknowledging that
"[d]efinitions of terrorism are particularly outcome sensitive precisely
because they tend to delimit the range of lawful responses to them."' 37
Accordingly, definitions reflect the values and goals of the authors
and mandate the type of responses those authors intuitively support
rather than responses arrived at through objective analysis.
Industrialized states tend to define terrorism with an emphasis on
terrorist acts while developing nations tend to focus on the causes of
terrorism. Industrialized states wish to "arrest, prevent and deter" ter-
rorist acts through strict and efficient enforcement while the develop-
ing countries wish to alleviate the miserable underlying conditions
that lead to terrorism.'38 These latter goals are inconsistent with the
industrialized nations' aims as they necessarily call for a redistribution
of wealth and power. Poverty and aggression, along with religious
133. PHILIP HERBST, TALKING TERRORISM: A DICTIONARY OF THE LOADED LANGUAGE OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 164 (2003).
134. Helena Cobban, Unintended Consequences: A Forum on Iraq and the Mideast,
THE NATION, Aug. 15-22, 2005, at 22.
135. HERBST, supra note 133, at 164.
136. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 3, 9(1999).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7-8.
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motivations, are the root causes of most contemporary terrorism. This
dichotomy renders the expression "one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter" particularly meaningful. 139
The Special Rapporteur has indicated her "leaning towards [a
working definition of terrorism] . . . in order to delimit the subject
matter with greater precision. . . ."14 While acknowledging the ambi-
tiousness of such an enterprise, she specifically conceded the utility of
a generally accepted definition.14" ' It appears that much of the dissen-
tion in the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights (Sub-Commission) concerns whether the enterprise is
possible at all.'42 In light of the hopeless deadlock of some U.N. ini-
tiatives, 4 3 this consideration has some merit. Fueling the pessimism
about achieving consensus is the current atmosphere generated by a
purportedly conservative, commerce-driven U.S. administration deal-
ing with the impact of 9/11. In a world quickly becoming polarized
again (economically divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots"
instead of by ideology), it is easy to concede the impossibility of arriv-
ing at a definition of terrorism. To suggest that the industrialized na-
tions will accept responsibility for terrorist acts owing to wealth and
power disparities may be an exercise in futility.
On the other hand, the hopelessness and desperation of the "have-
nots" carry an intractable mandate that can brook no compromise.
The passionate Indian writer Arundhati Roy eloquently describes the
hardship of the Palestinian people in appraising "suicide bombing [as]
an act of individual despair, not a revolutionary tactic." 144 In contrast,
Article 27 of the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement
(Hamas) states, "[W]e will become its soldiers and fuel for its fire that
will burn the enemies."' 145 Therein lies the dichotomy: one side pos-
139. Progress Report, supra note 31, 25.
140. Id. 26.
141. Id.
142. See id. In 24-29.
143. See A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 4, V 157, 159-60.
144. Roy, supra note 45, at 61.
145. Hamas, Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, art. 27, Aug. 18, 1988,
available at http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm. Hamas was established in 1988 as a
movement independent of the PLO and called for more radical change and means to obtain
change than the PLO. See MidEast Web, The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement
(Hamas), http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). "The Hamas has
a 'military' wing ... that engages in terrorist acts," and the organization is dedicated to the
obliteration of Israel and the destruction of Zionism. Id. Article 10 of the Covenant proposes,
"As the Islamic Resistance Movement paves its way, it will back the oppressed and support
the wronged with all its might. It will spare no effort to bring about justice and defeat injus-
tice, in word and deed, in this place and everywhere it can reach and have influence therein."
Hamas, supra, art. 10. Conversely, Article 11 states, "the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf
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sesses unprecedented power and wealth that it refuses to relinquish,
whereas the other possesses the desperation of peoples with nothing
left to lose, and where compromise equals death. In this postmodern
lion's den, it is understandable how consensus has eluded the United
Nations.
The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has
proffered the following definition:
[T]errorism [is] any action, in addition to actions already specified
by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva
Conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is
intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context,
is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an in-
ternational organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 'I
However, this definition is at once too narrow and too broad. It is
too broad because it includes not only terrorist acts, but also counter-
terrorist actions modeled on the military approach as in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each case, the coalition involved sought to
intimidate or compel a population, government, or international or-
ganization to act or abstain from acting, such as refraining from terror-
ist activity or support. While the coalitions' actions were ostensibly
directed at armed forces, they necessarily resulted in civilian casual-
ties, rendering the distinction small and, to the victims, meaningless.
Furthermore, except in response to state-sponsored terrorism, the use
of a military model is usually directed at scattered targets that, rather
than being neatly organized in armed militias, are camouflaged within
the community, in effect ensuring a campaign directed at innocent ci-
vilian populations as much as at the terrorists. This net effect also
holds true for occupations; in Iraq, military intelligence officers esti-
mate that seventy to ninety percent of all detainees have no connection
to terrorism and were arrested by mistake. 147
consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day .... This is the law governing
the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the same goes for any land Moslems have
conquered by force, because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems conse-
crated these lands to Moslem generations till the Day of Judgment." Id. art. 10. The meas-
ures endorsed by Hamas to ensure the Moslem maintenance of the land of Islamic conquests
eschew peaceful resolution, and Hamas describes peaceful solutions and international confer-
ences as contradictory to the Islamic Resistance Movement. Id art. 13. "These conferences
are only ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitrators. When did infi-
dels do justice to the believers?" Id. However, Hamas does not speak for the entire Islamic
community and, in Article 27, concedes that the PLO is a secular organization that contradicts
the religious ideology of Hamas. Id. art. 27.
146. A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 4, 1 164.
147. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 53, 1 7.
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The High-level Panel's definition is too narrow in the sense that it
is insensitive to the root causes of terrorism. In this respect, the defi-
nition reverts to previous reactionary models favoring law enforce-
ment and military responses over proactive ones.148 Admittedly, the
High-level Panel includes numerous prevention devices and human
rights sensitivities in its 101 recommendations, such as social, politi-
cal, and economic justice issues, but fails to provide an institutional
foundation for those initiatives. Without reference to human rights is-
sues in the definition, those recommendations will be seen as supple-
mental rather than reflective of core counter-terrorism policy and,
consequently, will be the first to be abandoned. Accordingly, this
definition does not break any new ground. It does not distinguish be-
tween terrorists and freedom fighters or between terrorists and gov-
ernments engaged in counter-terrorism initiatives. It also does not ad-
dress the underlying conditions that promote terrorism and is
ambivalent toward modem trends in human rights jurisprudence.
Thus, this definition does nothing to bridge the chasm between a
causal treatment of terrorism and a reactionary one.
According to Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the International Re-
search Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
"It can be predicted with confidence that the disputes about a compre-
hensive, detailed definition of terrorism will continue for a long time,
that they will not result in a consensus, and that they will make no no-
ticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism.'' 49
Notwithstanding this seemingly hopeless stalemate, steps toward a
universal definition can be taken. H6ctor Fix Zamudio, an expert ad-
vising the Sub-Commission, 50 believes that a definition is possible "as
had happened in the case of the concepts of indigenous populations
and minorities."'' While deadlocked on the issue of self-
determination, arriving at a definition of "indigenous peoples" was
148. These models have some deterrent value, which can be credited as a device of pre-
vention. However, that value is hardly operative against suicide bombers and populations
without recourse to conventional institutions for resolving grievances and providing for basic
necessities, or those who seek ever-greater publicity for their cause.
149. Walter Laqueur, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 79 n.* (1987), quoted in Schmid, supra
note 129, at 396.
150. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Working Groups of the Sub-
Commission, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/subcom/groups.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2006) (indicating that Mr. Zamudio is the Latin American member of the Sessional Working
Group on the Administration of Justice); Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Working Group on the Administration of Justice, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/
2/subwgaj.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (indicating that members of the Sessional Working
Group are subject matter experts).
151. Progress Report, supra note 31, 1 27.
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equally political but was arguably circumvented by adhering to a tran-
sitional format where the working group considered a number of prin-
ciples.1 52  This template, which can be referred to as "principles
among those to be considered," calls for greater flexibility and a case-
by-case analysis. 113 Though the template does not provide a uniformly
dispositive definition, it still represents an improvement on the status
quo and blends well into a holistic format for countering terrorism. A
more inclusive definition would allow more varied counter-terrorism
measures and approaches to be included in policy. 54 Furthermore, a
universally accepted, transitional format consisting of "principles
among those to be considered" in delimiting and focusing on the prob-
lem of terrorism would not constitute too broad an approach, as each
analysis would hinge upon a multi-prong test giving certain principles
greater or lesser weight or relevance in accordance with individual
circumstances.
The Sub-Commission has already set parameters within which it
conceptualizes terrorism and "scrutiniz[es] its essential elements and
manifestations, with a view to obtaining and drawing together basic
definitional components .... 55 These parameters include delinea-
tions along the line of the actors (state, state-sponsored, and sub-state
or individual terrorism) and of the manifestations 5 6 (direct manifesta-
tion, by threatening "the right to life, liberty and dignity of the indi-
vidual;" the right to a democratic society; and rights relating to "social
peace and public order;' ' 157 and indirect manifestation, such as in
counter-terrorist measures). Additionally, "principles among those to
be considered" is broad enough to account for the widely acknowl-
edged elements of terrorism, such as the fear, violence, and intimida-
tion it produces, the fact that its immediate victim is not usually its ul-
timate target, and the randomness that it employs in order to convey
its message. Equally important are the root causes of terrorism, which
include the misery, frustration, and hopelessness of the disenfran-
152. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Working Paper: The Concept
of "Indigenous People, " 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) [herein-
after U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, The Concept of "Indigenous People"] (prepared by Erica-
Irene A. Daes). See generally U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Secretariat of the Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues, The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
PFII/2004/WS. 1/3 (Jan. 19, 2004).
153. Cf U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, The Concept of "Indigenous People," supra note
152,1 68.
154. See Progress Report, supra note 31, 30.
155. Id.
156. Id. 35.
157. Preliminary Report, supra note 34, 18.
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chised who may be outnumbered or kept in check through modern
technology, and the corruption of national leaders, their powerful for-
eign allies, and the multinational corporations and military-industrial
complex that empowers them. Moreover, a set of "principles among
those to be considered" would also recognize that those who engage in
terrorist activities, and their supporters, employ historical, religious,
traditional, nationalistic, and ideological norms to justify their acts.
Can these parameters and essential elements, organized into a
transitional format, constitute a working definition that can acquire
general acceptance? The answer may depend upon the principles em-
ployed. For example, principles could include the political motives
for terrorism, the widespread disparity of wealth and power distribu-
tion, and religious fanaticism. The principles must be broad enough to
include both the terrorist acts and their underlying root causes. How-
ever, the purpose of such a definition must be clear: it would serve
merely as a transitional device with the ultimate goal of arriving at a
more clearly articulated definition. The transitional medium creates
an environment that allows for a more holistic response, at least in the
short term, in order to address widespread terrorist activity compre-
hensively. Such a framework would not only allow for combating ter-
rorism under traditional methodologies, but also would minimize tra-
ditional constraints, thereby stemming recruitment by addressing
cause and effect. As a step in arriving at a universal definition, the
transitional method engenders concessions and recognizes conflicting
political claims. A new dialectic must replace the older dichotomy be-
tween the law enforcement, military approach and the causal, human
rights approach. This new model, fueled by a universally accepted
transitional format and grounded in a human rights focus, if success-
ful, could render the previous dichotomy irrelevant and, as a policy
matter, result in a greater net synergy of human rights than that merely
attributable to the eradication of terrorism. Additionally, as discussed
above, such a result would be consistent with recent international
trends in the development of human rights mechanisms and jurispru-
dence, counter-terrorism initiatives, and many of the 101 recommen-
dations of the High-level Panel.
Furthermore, the concerns arising from the duel criminality doc-
trine with respect to the need for a uniformly agreed upon definition
are overblown. The substantive acts constituting terrorism, such as
mass murder and kidnapping, are still prohibited in virtually every
country. They are therefore actionable for purposes of accountability
and transnational cooperation, such as extradition. The use of a transi-
tional format without a precise immutable definition will not nega-
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tively affect international law enforcement efforts. Rather, it may al-
low greater flexibility by providing a wider expanse of core common
elements.
In order to realistically deal with the threat of terrorism and the
miserable conditions that give rise to it, a more precise delimitation of
the problem must become generally accepted. As a multi-faceted di-
lemma that is subject to competing political ideologies, the task of de-
fining terrorism seems to grow more distant and elusive. With each
new counter-terrorism measure that ignites new terrorist attacks, po-
larizes communities, and justifies the terrorists in the eyes of the more
moderate, driving them to extremism, the need for quick, unified ac-
tion becomes apparent. If an immutable definition is not presently
feasible, then a transitional format needs to be approved, and a holistic
response adopted. Moreover, since the current framework is already
mired by division, almost entirely without structure or consensus and
given to dilution, the inclusive transitional format provides a point of
reference and greater clarity. Thus, a transitional format narrows the
focus, but simultaneously expands the available options for a solution
and therefore establishes a holistic basis for combating both the effects
and causes of terrorism. If a transitional format is not adopted, the
camps will remain polarized and continue to rattle sabers while inno-
cents suffer desperate and humiliating conditions and pointless vio-
lence. The process of consensus is slow, but adherence to a transi-
tional format may provide at least rudimentary structure and hasten
cohesion. The polarized dichotomy of the post 9/11 world offers less
than fertile soil for compromise but new transitions and events may
create new priorities and eventually allow for the de-polarization of a
definition of terrorism.
VI. THE FLAWS OF A MONOLITHIC STRATEGY
"During the presidential campaign, vice-president Dick Cheney
contemptuously criticised the application of law enforcement [to ter-
rorism] as effeminate 'sensitivity.' In June of this year [2005], Bush's
deputy chief of staff,, [sic] Karl Rove, attacked the very idea of 'in-
dictments' [of terrorists] as a symptom of liberal weakness. 1 158 These
observations seemingly reject all other counter-terrorism models
solely in favor of a military treatment. In context, however, these as-
158. Sidney Blumenthal, Editorial, Above the Rule of Law, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug.
5, 2005, at 23.
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sertions constitute little more than political rhetoric'59 as the United
States has never rejected the law enforcement model and, as previ-
ously discussed, the Bush administration has taken unprecedented
steps in strengthening that approach since 9/11. In a speech to the Na-
tional Press Club on July 22, 2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that he had "objected to the
use of the term 'war on terrorism' before, because if you call it a war,
then you think of people in uniform as being the solution."' 16  Despite
the current intensive role of the military, Myers said that solutions will
require "all instruments of our national power, all instruments of the
international communities' national power" and are "more diplomatic,
more economic, more political than [they are] military." 161 These ob-
servations reveal awareness that multiple approaches or models be-
yond military responses are necessary, and, despite the rhetoric, are
borne out by the official U.S. Department of State's National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism (National Strategy).62 The National Strat-
egy calls for multiple initiatives in combating terrorism and relates
counter-terrorism policy in terms of a "4D strategy."' 163  The four Ds
stand for:
1. "Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations";' 64
2. "Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terror-ists"; T65
3. "Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek
to Exploit";' and
4. "Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and
Abroad."' 167
159. Indeed, in July 2005 administration and Pentagon officials announced a re-
branding of the slogan "war on terror" asserting the proposition that "the long-term struggle is
as much an ideological battle as a military mission," thus backing off from the military meta-
phor. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, New Name for "War on Terror" Reflects Wider U.S.
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at A7. Soon thereafter, the Bush administration re-
versed its position and reinstated the slogan, Blumenthal, supra note 158, leading to the con-
clusion that such statements are only political rhetoric and not policy. This type of rhetoric
can be very dangerous however, as it belittles the value of a human rights approach, and irre-
sponsibly fosters a climate of intolerance, particularly in the Armed Forces.
160. Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
(2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY], available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/intemational_
security/terrorism.html (follow "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (PDF)" hyper-
link).
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. at 22.
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Remarkably, both General Myers and the National Strategy not
only take the importance of both the law enforcement and military
models as given, but seem to evince empathy toward the human rights
model. When discussing economic and political solutions, General
Myers seems to be referring to wealth disparities and political disen-
franchisement consistent with the human rights model. He even sug-
gests that they are more important to arriving at a solution than the
military option.'68
The National Strategy calls for "[d]iminish[ing] the [u]nderlying
[c]onditions that [t]errorists [s]eek to [e]xploit."'69 Similarly, the new
U.N. initiative calls for "[d]issuading the disaffected from choosing
terrorists tactics," but it also calls for "[d]efending human rights in the
struggle against the scourge of terror," 7 which is missing from the
National Strategy. As discussed previously, defending human rights
from terrorism is two-fold-guarding against direct attacks by terror-
ists and indirect assaults resulting from the imposition of overly harsh
counter-terrorist measures.' The National Strategy addresses direct
attacks by terrorists under the rubric of "defeat[ing] terrorists" and
"defend[ing] U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad," but fails
even to allude to the indirect impact of terrorism. 172 Thus, it is miss-
ing sensitivity to the human rights implications of the other models.
Specifically, the National Strategy fails to explicitly mandate the ap-
plication of human rights norms on law enforcement and military
models. Without a foundation of strict adherence to human rights
norms as official policy, the norms become impotent guidelines to be
followed only if the situation and circumstances allow. Excesses in
the "war on terrorism," at home and abroad, testify to the effects of a
failure to institutionalize human rights norms. This failure is also re-
flected in contemporary debates over safety versus civil liberties, the
Patriot Act, the attempted justification of the use of torture, and the
development of a torture warrant.'7 3 It is also partly responsible for
the United States' poor reputation abroad and for Amnesty Interna-
tional USA's call for the exercise of universal jurisdiction to prosecute
167. Id. at 24.
168. Cf Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 158.
169. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 162, at 22.
170. UNITED NATIONS FOUND., supra note 9, at 1.
171. See discussion supra Part I]I.
172. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 162, at 15, 24.
173. See, e.g., Legal Torture?, CBS NEWS, Sept. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/17/60ninutes/main324751 .shtml. See generally
Alan M. Dershowitz, The Case for Torture Warrants, 2002, http://www.law.harvard.edu/fac-
ulty/dershowitzlArticles/torturewarrants.html.
289
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Bush administration officials for torture. Moreover, this failure is
counterproductive because lax or nonexistent compliance with human
rights norms in the U.S. military and law enforcement models pro-
motes terrorist recruitment.
Additionally, the National Strategy goal of "[d]iminish[ing] the
[u]nderlying [c]onditions that [tierrorists [s]eek to [e]xploit"' 7 4 fails to
provide a convincing commitment to human rights. While it ac-
knowledges "that there are many countries and people living with
poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved po-
litical and regional disputes,"'75 it proposes nothing more than con-
tinuing "[o]ngoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster
economic, social, and political development, market-based economies,
good governance, and the rule of law," along with "win[ning] the 'war
of ideas' . ... 176 If previous, under-funded U.S. efforts were insuffi-
cient to stem the growing tide of global terrorism, continuing those
same unsuccessful measures cannot be expected to improve the status
quo. The National Strategy also stipulates, "[W]e will wage a war of
ideas to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate . .. ."I"
Thus, the U.S. human rights initiative apparently consists of continu-
ing failed efforts. On one hand, the United States continues to finance
a public relations campaign naively designed to convince poor, starv-
ing, dying, and disenfranchised people that terrorism is illegitimate.
On the other, it unrealistically attempts to intimidate future suicide
bombers by showing that acts of terrorism will be dealt with firmly.
The National Strategy poignantly illustrates that the United States
has no significant human rights policy specifically earmarked for
combating terrorism. Essentially, U.S. policy consists of military and
law enforcement initiatives. Indeed, in Iraq, U.S. policy consists al-
most entirely of a military model, as might be expected in a war zone,
and reveals the dangers and counterintuitive initiatives of a monolithic
strategy. Even a cursory view of developments in Iraq brings the need
for a holistic policy into focus. Despite misleading official statements
to the contrary, 17 8 the U.S. efforts in Iraq seem to have increased the
174. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 162, at 22.
175. Id. at 22.
176. Id. at 23.
177. Id.
178. A U.S. State Department report released on April 29, 2004 reported global terror-
ism was at its lowest level since 1969. Oops: State Dept. Reports Record Drop in Terrorism,
WORLD TRIBUNE.COM, June 13, 2004 http://216.26.163.62/2004/ss-terror_06_13.html. After
critics in Congress objected, the State Department issued a retraction admitting that the report
seriously distorted the threat. Id. In response, Colin Powell stated on NBC's "Meet the Press
that this statement was "very embarrassing" and that "we were wrong." Id.; see also Powell:
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resistance in Iraq and terrorism globally and the resulting threat in-
stead of reducing it. U.S. commanders estimated the number of insur-
gents at the end of 2003 at approximately 5,000.179 However, by the
end of 2004 Iraqi intelligence estimated the number as 40,000 active,
full-time fighters with an additional 160,000 "part-time fighters and
supporters who provide food, shelter, funds and intelligence.""18 By
January 9, 2006, the number of U.S. casualties in Iraq was 2,209
killed with an additional 16,379 wounded1 81 and the estimated number
of Iraqi civilians killed in the first two years of the war range from
25,000 to 128,000.182 The number of Iraqi wounded is undoubtedly
Terrorism Report was a "Big Mistake," MSNBC.coM, June 14, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5183158/. The corrected June 23, 2004 version of the State
Department's report PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM revealed that 2003 had "the largest
number of terror-related incidents deemed 'significant' at any time since the U.S. began issu-
ing these figures .... ." PHYLLIS BENNIS ET AL., A FAILED "TRANSITION": THE MOUNTING
COST OF THE IRAQ WAR 9 (2004), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/failedtransition/
(follow "Full report with citations" hyperlink) (referring to U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/).
Moreover, in an interview on CNN's Larry King Live, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
stated, "I think they're in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency." Iraq Insurgency in
"Last Throes," Cheney Says, CNN.cOM, May 31, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005IUS/05/30/cheney.iraq/ (emphasis added). Yet, soon thereafter,
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the insurgency "could go on for any
number of years" and could even last 12 years. Rumsfeld Braces for More Violence in Iraq:
Says Insurgency Could Endure 'for Any Number of Years," Perhaps Until 2017,
MSNBC.coM, June 26, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8366705.
179. Tom Lasseter & Jonathan S. Landay, Analysis: U.S. Losing Ground in War,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, at A8.
180. Id. Additionally, this does not include the number of insurgents actually captured
or killed, which is estimated to be approximately 24,000 by August 2004 (as noted in
MICHAEL E. O'HANLON & ADRIANA LINS DE ALBUQUERQUE, IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING
VARIABLES OF RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 8 (2004)), bringing the
total to at least 64,000 to 74,000. BENNIS, ET AL., supra note 178, at i.
181. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, U.S. Casualty Status (Jan. 9, 2006),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf (on file with author).
182. A report by Iraq Body Count published on July 18, 2005, claimed that nearly
25,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the two years following the start of the U.S.-led invasion.
Survey: 25,000 Civilians Killed in Iraq War, CNN.coM, July 20, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/19/iraq.bodycount/. Other estimates of the
number of civilians killed in the same period vary widely. For example, in July 2005 the Ge-
neva-based Institute of International Studies estimated that 39,000 Iraqis had been killed as a
direct result of combat or armed violence since March 2003. Irwin Arieff, 39,000 Iraqis
Killed in Fighting, New Study Finds, REUTERS.COM, July 11, 2005, http://today.reuters.
com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyld=Nl1220315. In contrast, according to the October
2004 issue of the medical journal THE LANCET, "at least 100,000 Iraqi civilians may have died
because of the U.S. invasion." Rob Stein, 100,000 Civilian Deaths Estimated in Iraq, WASH.
POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A16 (referring to Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the
2003 Invasion ofIraq, THE LANCET, Oct. 29, 2004). Critics suggest that the study figures are
inflated but LANCET researcher Les Roberts claimed that the real numbers "could be much
higher." Id; Roberts, supra. In addition, Iraqiyun, an Iraqi-based humanitarian organization,
reported that 128,000 Iraqis had been killed as of July 12, 2005, and that fifty-five percent of
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many times greater than those killed, and if consistent with the ratio of
the American troops, would range between 185,000 and 850,000.
Moreover, the majority of these civilian causalities have been women
and children.1 3 The monetary cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan has been over $314 billion, and estimates place the total projected
price at approximately $700 billion by the end of the occupation.184
The diplomatic and public relations costs are almost incalculable but
include the loss of foreign allies due to the largely unilateral attack,
the retreat from the Geneva Conventions, 185 the use of torture in at
least fourteen prisons in Iraq, 186 and the rendering of suspects to be
tortured in other countries. The perception of the United States as a
human rights leader has been ruined. This monolithic approach to
combating terrorism results in swelling, and potentially arming, 187 the
ranks of terrorist organizations and, many contend, has done vastly
greater harm than good. 88
them were children under the age of twelve or women. Iraqi Civilian Casualties, WORLD
PEACE HERALD, July 12, 2005, http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StorylD=20050712-
122153-5519r; see also David Cortright, Iraq: The Human Toll, THE NATION, July 24, 2005,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi=20050801&s=cortright.
183. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Pub. Health, Iraqi Civilian
Deaths Increase Dramatically After Invasion (Oct. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.jhsph.edu/PublicHealthNews/PressReleases/PR_2004/Burnhamraq.html (re-
ferring to statistics reported in Roberts, supra note 182).
184. James Sterngold, Casualty of War: The U.S. Economy, S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2005,
at Al. Additionally, if these projections prove correct, the costs of this conflict will exceed
the adjusted cost of the Korean War or the Vietnam War. "The Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments... has estimated that the Korean War cost about $430 billion and the
Vietnam War cost about $600 billion, in current dollars," well below the estimated $700 bil-
lion projection. Id.
185. Former White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales has described the Geneva Con-
ventions as "quaint" and advised against following some of their provisions because "this new
paradigm [the war on terrorism] renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of
enemy prisoners .. " Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel,
to George W. Bush, President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Pris-
oners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek; see also Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal
War Crimes Warnings, MSNBC.coM, May 19, 2004, httpJ/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
4999734/site/newsweek/.
186. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 53, IN 1, 24-25, 59.
187. In October 2004 news stories began to surface concerning the disappearance of a
380-ton stockpile of sophisticated explosives at the Al Qaqaa arms depot, see Disappearance
of Explosives in Question, CNN.coM, Oct. 27, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004IWORLD/meast/10/26/iraq.explosives/, which may have fallen into the hands of the in-
surgents.
188. See, e.g., BENNIS, ET AL., supra note 178, at 8. According to the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "the war in Iraq has accelerated recruitment to al Qaeda and
made the world less safe." Id. (citing INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC SURVEY
2003/4 169 (2004) (U.K.)). The USS estimates the total "al Qaeda membership.., at 18,000
with 1,000 active in Iraq," and concluded that the occupation has provided a "'potent global
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Conversely, strict adherence to an integrated human rights model
would probably have prevented the war,18 9 particularly as there was no
recruitment pretext"' and thereby "weakened the 'war on terrorism."' Id. (citing and quoting
INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra, at 6-7). According to Richard Clarke, "The Iraq
war took resources away from the fight against al Qaeda, which was able to survive and
morph into a hydra-headed monster." Trudy Rubin, Iraq Prison Scandal: Arab Hearts and
Minds May Be Lost Forever, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 6, 2004, at 21A, quoted in
BENNIS, ET AL., supra note 178, at 8. The lessons of Iraq have inspired hundreds of Muslims
to radicalize, "dramatically strengthening [al Qaeda's] recruitment efforts." BENNIS, ET AL.,
supra note 178, at 9 (citing Patrick E. Tyler & Don Van Natta, Jr., Militants in Europe Openly
Callfor Jihad and the Rule of Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at Al). The nexus between
the Iraq war and occupation and the increase in terrorist attacks is demonstrated by a study of
what motivates the terrorists who carry out the attacks. In Dying to Win, the Strategic Logic
of Suicide Terrorism, author Robert Pape conducted a study of suicide bombings from 1983
to 2003 ("315 attacks carried out by 462 bombers ... involving 18 different organizations"),
Fred Kaplan, It's Not Who We Are, It's What We Do: What Can Terrorists Teach Us?, SLATE,
July 20, 2005, http://slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2123010, and found what they
had in common was "a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modem democracies to
withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland."
ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 4 (2005),
quoted in Kaplan, supra.
Hussain Osman, one of the men alleged to have participated in London's failed
bombings on July 21[, 2005], recently told Italian investigators that they prepared
for the attacks by watching "films on the war in Iraq," La Repbblica reported.
"Especially those where women and children were being killed and exterminated
by British and American soldiers.., of widows, mothers and daughters that cry."
Naomi Klein, Terror's Greatest Recruitment Tool, THE NATION, Aug. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?=20050829&s=klein (quoting Claudia Fusani,
"Non volevamo colpire l'Italia" la lunga confessione nella notte, LA REPUBBLICA (Ital.), July
20, 2005). A study published in March 2005 conducted by the Global Research in Interna-
tional Affairs Center, found that "the vast majority of Arabs killed in Iraq have never taken
part in any terrorist activities prior to their arrival in Iraq." Reuven Paz, Arab Volunteers
Killed in Iraq, 3 PROJECT FOR THE RESEARCH OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (PRISM) OCCASIONAL
PAPERS 5 (2005) (Isr.), available at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM-no 1_vol_3_-
_Arabskilled in.Iraq.pdf, quoted in Kaplan, supra. The author of another study conducted
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nawaf Obaid, stated that of 250 Saudis
who went to fight in Iraq, many were from prominent families, "watched the destructive im-
ages of the war on Arabic satellite TV, and.., read the jihadist Web sites' urgings to go repel
the infidel's occupation." Kaplan, supra (referring to the then-as-yet-unpublished report
NAWAF OBAID & ANTHONY CORDESMAN, SAUDI MILITANTS IN IRAQ: ASSESSMENT AND
KINGDOM'S RESPONSE 9 (2005), available at http://www.csis.org/index.php?op-
tion=comcsis pubs&task=view&id=1442 (follow "Download PDF' hyperlink)). Obaid also
stated, "Abu Ghraib was just a disaster .... a resounding call to these kids." Id.; see also
OBAID, supra, at 9.
189. An integrated human rights model fashioned after the template suggested by the
U.N. High-level Panel would have distinguished the Iraq War from the invasion of Afghani-
stan. Because Afghanistan was demonstrably a state sponsor of terrorism, military interven-
tion furthered the legitimate goal of deterring state sponsored terrorism consistent with the
military counter-terrorism model. Moreover, the Afghan conflict arguably met the condi-
tional criteria for authorized use of force laid out in the High-level Panel's report. See A
MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 4, T 207 at 67. These criteria permit the use of force for a
proper purpose, in the face of a serious threat, as a last resort, when the means employed are
proportionate and the balance of consequences favors action. Id. The Iraq war, on the other
hand, did not meet these prerequisites because the perceived threat was not serious enough to
warrant military intervention, the primary purpose of the invasion was at issue, all non-
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connection between the 9/11 attacks and the Hussein regime and thus,
no creditable claim of state-sponsored terrorism.' 9° By spending less
than half of the money already spent on the military model, a stand-
alone human rights approach in the developing world could have sig-
nificantly reduced hunger, supplied immunizations for children and
medicine for people with HIV/AIDS, and provided clean water and
sanitation for over two years.191 Essentially, instead of increasing the
terrorist threat exponentially, the United States could have saved half
of the money and all of the lives while simultaneously authoring a
twenty-first century Marshall Plan. 192 Such a plan would have eradi-
cated most of the sources of terrorism, thereby minimizing terrorist
recruitment, support, and sympathy on the ground. 93 While the post
9/11 political climate was inhospitable to a massive foreign aid
military options had not yet been explored and exhausted, the means used were disproportion-
ate to the threat, and the foreseeable consequences of action were far worse than the foresee-
able consequences of inaction.
190. Despite numerous claims and allusions to the contrary, the definitive admission
that there were no ties between the Hussein regime and al Qaeda came during the 2004 Vice-
Presidential debate in remarks by Vice-President Cheney. See Dick Cheney, U.S. Vice Presi-
dent, John Edwards, N.C. Senator, & Gwen Ifill, PBS, Vice Presidential Debate at Case
Western Reserve University (PBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_1005.html.
191. BENNIS, ET AL., supra note 178, at 54; cf Dick Bell & Michael Renner, A New
Marshall Plan? Advancing Human Security and Controlling Terrorism, WORLD WATCH
INST., Oct. 9, 2001, http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/ (follow "A New Marshall Plan?
Advancing Human Security and Controlling Terrorism" hyperlink). "The U.N.'s Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that it would only need $24 billion annually to cut
world hunger in half. That would translate to 400 million people currently malnourished
gaining access to sufficient food, many for the first time in their lives." Id. (citing Press Re-
lease, United Nations Food and Agr. Org., FAO Unveils Global Anti-Hunger Program (June
4, 2002), available at http'J/www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2002/5500-en.html). "The
director of UNAIDS needs only $10 billion annually to launch a truly global, comprehensive
program to respond to HIV/AIDS." Id. (citing Peter Piot, Executive Dir., UNAIDS, & Under
Secretary-General, United Nations, AIDS: The Need for an Exceptional Response to an Un-
precedented Crisis, Presidential Fellows Lecture at the World Bank (Nov. 20, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/Media/Speeches02/PiotWorldBank_
20Nov03_enpdf.pdf). "The UN Children's Organization UNICEF estimates that it would
take a mere $2.8 billion annually to provide immunization for every child in the developing
world." Id. (citing UNICEF, IMMUNIZE EVERY CHILD: GAVI STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
IMMUNIZATION SERVICES 16 (2000), available at http://www.unicef.org/immunization/ immu-
nize.every-child.pdf). "To provide clean water and functioning sewage systems to the
world's population, the World Water Council estimates an annual cost of $37 billion." Id
(citing JAMES WINPENNY, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 3 (2003), available at
http://www.worldwaterforum4.org.mx/uploads/TBL DOCS_35_17.pdf (suggesting that be-
tween $10 and $49 billion in additional investments are needed annually)). These programs
total to $74 billion a year, id., or $148 billion for two years, see id., less than half of the $314
billion cost of the military campaign, see Sterngold, supra note 184.
192. Cf. Bell & Renner, supra note 191.
193. See id.
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agenda, as the climate cools greater emphasis may be placed on pre-
vention consistent with a human rights model.
Alternatively, an integrated human rights model would have pre-
vented excesses that have further exacerbated global polarization. For
example, both rendition to other states and the atrocities at Abu
Ghraib and other detention facilities would have been strictly prohib-
ited had military and civilian personnel been adequately trained in
human rights principles. 94 Under an integrated human rights model,
suspects would not have been rounded up en masse, in a net cast so
widely that it apprehended a supermajority of innocent detainees. 95
Moreover, the nexus between human rights law and humanitarian law
would have precluded Bush administration officials from eschewing
the Geneva Conventions, leading to different treatment at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Bagram Air Force Base, and Iraqi detention facilities.1 96
It is axiomatic that information obtained under torture is inherently
unreliable; 197 yet, even if it were helpful, the public relations impact
and bad faith that the use of torture ignites create the potential for far
greater harm and spread terrorism more widely. Correctly applied, a
military model with a human rights structure built in as a governor can
be beneficial against global terrorism, where reliance on a single
194. Cf. INT'LCOMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 53, 23, 37, 44, 63.
195. Cf. id. 5-8.
196. Cf. id.tIn23,37,44.
197. E.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52 (FM 34-52): INTELuGENCE
INTERROGATION 1-8 (1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ (follow "FM
34-52, Intelligence Interrogation" hyperlink). The U.S. Senate unanimously denounced and
recognized the unreliability of torture and in 2004 offered bi-partisan legislation in the form
of the anti-torture amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill. Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, S. 2400, 108th Cong. §
1057 (as passed by the Senate, June 23, 2004); Nomination of The Honorable Alberto R. Gon-
zales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, to Be the Attorney General of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Sen. Richard J.
Durbin) [hereinafter Durbin], available at http://talkleft.con/Gonzaleshearingstatementfi-
nal.htm. Though the Senate bill was passed over the objections of the Bush administration,
Durbin, supra, that version was not enacted. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1756 (enacting H.R.
4200, rather than S. 2400). while the House of Representatives version that was enacted does
condemn torture, it does not acknowledge the inherent unreliability of torture. Compare id. §
1091 with S. 2400 § 1057.
THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL ON INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION states, "Use of torture or any
other illegal methods is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may damage subse-
quent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the interrogator
wants to hear. Revelation of use of torture by U.S. personnel will bring discredit upon the
U.S. and its armed forces while undermining domestic and international support for the war
effort. It may also place U.S. and allied personnel in enemy hands at greater risk of abuse by
their captors." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra, quoted in Durbin, supra.
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model, especially without an integrated human rights structure, has re-
sulted in a backlash and left the struggle far more desperate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Professor Susan Tiefenbrun's article, A Semiotic Approach to a
Legal Definition of Terrorism, concludes:
It is possible to de-center this paradox and to reduce the definitional
difficulty by proposing a categorical prohibition on the use of ter-
rorism, no matter how lofty the purpose may be, no matter how
worthy the political or ideological cause may seem to those op-
pressed by tyrannical regimes. There is no justification for terror-
ism. It is not defensible to argue that terrorism needs to be viewed
from a political context and that the "motivation" of the actor and
the sociological context in which the act occurs must be taken into
consideration. Such an approach would legitimize terrorist acts by
claiming that the ends justify the means. The Machiavellian princi-
ple that the ends justify the means simply does not comport with
the generally accepted principles of the rule of law. 198
Though it seeks to reduce the bloodshed, this proposed solution is ill
advised as it fails to reflect either the moral or the practical impera-
tives encountered by those who are "oppressed by tyrannical re-
gimes." Rather than delimit terrorism, it reinforces the validity of a
double standard. To those whose homes are bombed and loved ones
maimed or killed by state actors, a categorical prohibition against ter-
rorism has a hollow ring, as the subtle distinction between the applica-
tion of Machiavellian principles by state actors and by non-state actors
is lost. Moreover, it presupposes the validity of the status quo, to
some a horrible reality, and assumes that terrorism itself ultimately
can be stopped by resorting to force. Force is ineffective against peo-
ples whose children are starving, whose homes are bombed, and who
live under the yoke of political or economic tyranny. Iraq provides
vivid testimony to the proposition that force only begets more force.
The ends do not justify the means and the innocent should not be
made to carry the burden of sociopolitical economic disparities.
However, to ignore the "motivations" for terrorism is to deny the va-
lidity of the suffering of those innocents.
The United Nations has recognized that the solution to terrorism is
more complex than an artificial prohibition and the use of a military or
law enforcement approach. The High-level Panel's observations and
198. Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9
INT'L L. STUDENTS Assoc. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 357, 388-89 (2003).
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recommendations make this recognition apparent. Terrorism is a hu-
man rights issue, and the model for a solution should be grounded in a
human rights approach using human rights techniques, sensitivities,
and jurisprudence. Terrorism has a tremendous effect on human
rights, both directly and indirectly and thus, the moral, if not legal, ju-
risdiction of the human rights mechanisms is manifest. Without a
counter-terrorism solution grounded in human rights, the cure will re-
sult in greater depravation of civil liberties and in a Pandora's Box of
atrocities. Developments in the "war on terror" support this predic-
tion.
Additionally, a human rights approach is consistent with the
emerging understanding that massive human rights abuses may justify
piercing national boundaries. Increased globalization creates a greater
ripple effect with respect to human rights violations. Universal adher-
ence to human rights norms and two generations of human rights ef-
forts have resulted in increased international scrutiny and allow for ju-
risdiction over egregious human rights depravations. The recent
convergence of human rights instruments with counter-terrorism in-
struments further cements the link between human rights and terror-
ism and allows for jurisdiction over state sponsors of terrorism and the
activities of non-state actors. Thus, there is a legal, intellectual, moral,
and historical grounding for a human rights approach to counter-
terrorism. The suggestions of the High-level Panel can be read to im-
ply a tripartite initiative including law enforcement and military mod-
els as well as a manifold human rights model consisting of stand alone
and integrated components.
This multifaceted approach requires a transitional format for de-
fining terrorism as the current deadlock precludes a holistic counter-
terrorism policy. A "principles among those to be considered"
framework allows for the flexibility of initiatives that address both
cause and effect. The High-level Panel's proposed definition is unfor-
tunate and unnecessary. It contradicts the other initiatives extant in
the recommendations and relies on a traditional, outmoded, and in-
complete treatment of counter-terrorism. Without a definition
grounded in human rights, counter-terrorism efforts will revert to
purely military and law enforcement models.
Moreover, a tripartite model that seeks to address terrorism on all
relevant levels requires a massive expansion of the role of human
rights, human rights organizations, and human rights bodies. Gov-
ernments, particularly amongst the industrialized states, need to make
a significant, long-term commitment to both relieving inequities and
strictly conforming national efforts to human rights norms. This ex-
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pansion of the primacy of human rights bodies would serve to scruti-
nize and arrest the conditions that create hopelessness as well as abate
overzealous counter-terrorist activities by states. Human rights ma-
chinery may also be marshaled in the actual law enforcement process,
through both the International Criminal Court and ad hoc or hybrid
tribunals The use of human rights mechanisms brings a transparency
to the process that is counter-intuitive, and therefore lacking, in other
models. Naturally, as law enforcement and military models rely, in
part, on secrecy, some of their operations would remain opaque, but
an integrated human rights policy would preclude clandestine trans-
gressions. The tripartite model calls for a massive departure from the
initiatives currently in place in terms of allocation of funds. A twenty-
first century Marshall.Plan, and a military confined to addressing state
sponsors of terrorism, peacekeeping, and ensuring the orderly distribu-
tion of aid would require a huge transfer of funds from military opera-
tions to humanitarian assistance.
The establishment of a human rights model complete with a tran-
sitional definition format is desirable for four reasons. First, such an
approach could render the current deadlock on a definition of terror-
ism meaningless. This deadlock only serves to deplete scarce re-
sources and diminish the world focus on eradicating terrorism. The
consequences of endless debates sounding in perceived national inter-
ests result in competing national methodologies, which are often at
odds with each other and with accepted principles of human rights.
The status quo serves to increase the ability of some authorities to
conduct witch-hunts and further nationalistic goals or to quell political
dissent. Enthusiastic Russian acquiescence to the U.S.-led "war on
terrorism" could be attributable to the goal of employing harsh meth-
ods of silencing Chechen dissent199 and there are authoritative views
that the 9/11 attacks were used as a pretext for the Iraq war.200 A hu-
man rights model would circumvent the status quo and decrease the
ability of some actors to usurp the debate while allowing for broader
international cooperation in developing a comprehensive counter-
terrorism approach.
Second, this model calls for the empowerment of extant human
rights organs by substantially increasing their jurisdiction and size.
These enlarged human rights organs would not only serve to decrease
terrorist atrocities and violence, they would synergistically relieve
199. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 136 (referring to the relationship between Bin
Laden and oppressed Muslims seeking independence in Chechnya).
200. See, e.g., id. at 30.
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many of the underlying human rights violations that constitute the root
causes of terrorism and prevent the excesses carried out in the name of
counter-terrorism. Given the ripple effect of modem globalism, this
initiative would spill over into regions, which though not currently in-
volved in terrorist activities, are nonetheless disadvantaged and sus-
ceptible. Moreover, an empowered human rights model could have
precluded U.S. torture practices in the contemporary "war on terror"
and reinforced the Geneva Conventions and domestic civil liberties.
Furthermore, massive expansion of human rights organs is a desirable
end in itself as the need to combat terrorism could morph into a
greatly expanded global observation of human rights and thus give
some meaning to the death of the innocent victims. A human rights
model is far superior to one modeled on war. Where the former may
empower and expand existing human rights organs, the latter will
likely lead to greater violence and polarization and ultimately will un-
dermine them. The United States' "war on terrorism" has had the un-
intended result of creating more terrorism and insurgency and dimin-
ishing the role of human rights. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak
warned against invading Iraq stating, "If there is one (Osama) bin
Laden now, there will be 100 bin Ladens afterward.""2 ° Revelations
of U.S. policy regarding the Geneva Conventions and its justifications
for using torture substantially lower the bar and encourage other states
to turn away from previously accepted norms, thus causing the oppo-
site result of a human rights model and ushering in a net loss of human
dignity worldwide.
Additionally, a model fashioned after war instead of human rights
requires adherence to the law of warfare. Under the Third Geneva
Convention, combatants are required to be released at the conclusion
of the hostilities.2 2 Therefore, at the conclusion of the war, the "ter-
rorists," as combatants, must be released and arguably would pose a
substantial threat to international security and safety. Under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, non-combatants are subject to civil pro-
tections and are entitled to basic due process.2 3 If the "terrorists"
were classified as civilians or non-combatants, then they would have
201. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, Address to Egyptian Army Commanders in
Suez (Mar. 31, 2003), quoted in Egypt's Mubarak Warns "100 Bin Ladens," CBS NEWS,
Mar. 31, 2003, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/31/world/main547033.shtml.
202. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 118. Article 118 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention states, "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after
the cessation of active hostilities." Id.
203. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
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to be accorded due process and civil protection rights.20" This latter
treatment is extremely unlikely, because classifying "terrorists" as
non-combatants in a "war on terrorism" is counterintuitive. Amid
harsh criticism, the United States has established a third class of de-
tainees called "enemy combatants," in order to hold suspects with nei-
ther the civil protections afforded civilians nor the guarantee of release
at the conclusion of hostilities afforded to combatants.2"5 This practice
is criticized as unauthorized, without precedent, 206 amounting to illegal
detention and a war crime in violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions. 2°7 While a detailed analysis of the designation "enemy
combatant" is beyond the scope of this article, it nonetheless serves to
illustrate the constraints of the military model, and the extent to which
administration officials have gone to vitiate those constraints. Absent
the "enemy combatant" designation and assuming that the "terrorists"
are treated as combatants in the conventional sense, the only practical
means to indefinitely detain them and not violate the Geneva Conven-
tion is by maintaining a permanent state of war. Such a conclusion is
unacceptable and illustrative of the defects of a military model.
Third, the inclusive nature of a human rights model presents the
advantage of increased international cooperation and tolerance that
can lead to better organized efforts to apprehend terrorists. The
United Nations and other international organizations have taken steps
to begin the process of transnational cooperation such as the 9/11
Clearinghouse and treaties involving the financing of terrorist
204. Id. art. 5. Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does allow for derogation of
some protections of non-combatants if they are suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to
the security of the state or if they are detained as spies or saboteurs in occupied territory. Id.
However, such persons shall be "treated with humanity, and in the case of trial, shall not be
deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention." Id.
205. See AMNESTY INT'L, APPEALING FOR JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT HEARS ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE DETENTION OF YASER EsAM HAMDI AND JOSE PADILLA 1 (2004),
http:/web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr5l0652004. Among the chorus of voices criti-
cizing the designation "enemy combatant" is Amnesty International USA, which describes the
indefinite detentions of suspects as a violation "[of] fundamental principles of international
human rights and humanitarian law, in particular the prohibition against arbitrary detention."
Id. at 4.
206. See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407,
1420-10 (2002). The case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), has been widely cited as
precedent for the "enemy combatant" designations proffered by the Bush administration. See
id. at 1420. Critics argue that this case had a much narrower construction than its current ap-
plication and that this designation was only authorized if "Congress declared war and specifi-
cally authorized [military] commissions in its Articles of War." See id. Moreover, Dickinson
suggests that the "enemy combatant" designation is a violation of the War Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2441 (2000 & Supp. 1 2002). See id at 1421.
207. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 205, at 6.
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groups. 208 However, commitment to a human rights model would
bring these efforts under one banner with a consistent set of rules,
perhaps with the International Criminal Court taking an active role.
Such a commitment would result in a truly international effort, rather
than one posited in disorganized domestic responses. The Group of
Eight (G8) and the U.N. Global Compact are examples of two intema-
tional initiatives designed to relieve underlying suffering and promote
sustainable development. 2° As evidenced by the "war on terrorism,"
relying on domestic resolutions, unilateral initiatives, and law en-
forcement and military responses alone creates division amongst tradi-
tional allies and fails to adequately shepherd international commit-
ment.
Finally, a human rights model encourages transparency. Trans-
parency is vital to expose the underlying conditions and human rights
violations that give rise to terrorism. It also reveals the methods of in-
terrogation and other practices used in the apprehension of prisoners
and curtails overzealous responses by states. A transparent human
rights model would have prevented the torture dealt at the hands of the
United States in Iraq and Afghanistan by ensuring the reasonable
treatment of detainees by a multinational force under the scrutiny of
organs dedicated to the promotion of human dignity.
A multilateral response to terrorism utilizing a tripartite approach
is pragmatic, morally desirable, and consistent with ongoing efforts of
the United Nations and trends in international public law, international
counter-terrorism, and international human rights law. The burden of
countering international terrorism is not borne by the United States
alone, but as the world's sole superpower, it must carry a large portion
of the responsibility. However, the people of the United States are
faced with an unprecedented deficit, due in part to the Iraq War, and
with the graphic images of 9/11 still fresh in their minds. They are
therefore unlikely to embrace a massive international aid program or
to give priority to integrating human rights norms into counter-
terrorism policy. Yet, failure to do so may result in a continuation of
the violence, short-term fixes, and worsening conditions. As illus-
trated by the extraordinary implementation of international and do-
mestic law enforcement measures enacted in response to 9/11, interna-
tional cooperation in reversing the pandemic of terrorism is available.
208. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
209. See Univ. of Toronto, What Is the G8?, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
what isg8.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006); see United Nations Global Compact, What is the
Global Compact?, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited
Jan. 9, 2006).
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Much of this support should be directed at conquering terrorism by
eliminating its root causes instead of fanning the fires of hatred via a
monolithic, reactionary approach.
A U.S.-led multilateral coalition dedicated to reversing the condi-
tions exploited by terrorist groups conforms to many U.N. initiatives.
In addition to the recommendations of the High-level Panel, the
United Nations has developed the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).21 ° These goals consist of eight objectives: "1. Eradicate ex-
treme poverty and hunger[,] 2. Achieve universal primary education[,]
3. Promote gender equality and empower women[,] 4. Reduce child
mortality[,] 5. Improve maternal health[,] 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria and other diseases[,] 7. Ensure environmental sustainability[,
and] 8. Develop a global partnership for development."' It is the ob-
jective of the United Nations and all 191 Member States to achieve
these goals by 2015.212 Additionally, pursuant to U.N. reorganization
goals specifically regarding human rights, the Action 2 Initiative has
been put into place in order to integrate "sustainab[le] ... national
human rights protection systems" and to promote the MDGs.21 3
By fully funding these initiatives, promoting human rights, and
promoting sustainable development, the United States and the other
industrialized states could make significant progress toward prevent-
ing terrorism and eradicating its source. These efforts, along with
military and law enforcement initiatives that scrupulously observe
human rights norms, constitute the best chance of wiping out terror-
ism. Although a human rights approach may be currently unpopular
in the United States, public opinion and U.S. leadership tend to be cy-
clical. Given emerging trends in international counter-terrorism and
human rights law, change that may facilitate greater human rights sen-
sitivity and a holistic approach to counter-terrorism is foreseeable.
210. United Nations, What Are the Millennium Development Goals?
http://www.un.org/nillenniumgoals/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. United Nations, Action 2: Introduction, http://www.un.org/events/action2/ (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006). The Action 2 Initiative was formulated from a report by the Secretary-
General. Id.; The Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for
Further Change, 51, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/events/action2/A.57.0387.pdf.
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